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In this dissertation, I explore the relative importance of financial markets for
businesses on both firm-level and aggregate outcomes. In my second chapter, I find
empirically that local banking conditions are important for firm-level outcomes, in
particular for old and small firms. This finding has two implications, each of which
I explore in my second and third chapter, respectively.
First, the differential effect across firm age and size suggests sensitivity to
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young businesses to housing prices during the Great Recession.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Is firm-level finance important for aggregate outcomes? To what extent are
tighter credit conditions for businesses to blame for the severity of the most recent
recession? The importance of finance on the firm-side for the downturn and recovery
is much debated, and in many respects researchers are still grappling with the host
of potential mechanisms responsible for the Great Recession. At the same time,
recent literature has highlighted the fact that firms do not face homogenous credit
conditions (Chodorow-Reich (2014), Greenstone et al. (2014)). This apparent seg-
mentation in financial markets is important on several fronts. From an empirical
perspective, this variation provides the potential for examining the impact of credit
conditions on firm outcomes. Furthermore, the variation itself has implications for
misallocation. If firms do not have the same access to financing, or are dispropor-
tionately impacted by credit shocks, this prohibits the reallocation of inputs. In
particular, if credit conditions are correlated with firm characteristics, such as age,
size, and productivity, then aggregate growth and productivity can be impacted.
In this dissertation, I explore the relative importance of business credit on
both firm-level and aggregate outcomes. In my second chapter, I show empirically
that local banking conditions are important for firm-level outcomes, in particular
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for old and small firms. This finding poses several questions, which I explore in the
remainder of my second chapter and my third chapter. First, the differential effect
across firm age and size suggests sensitivity to financial conditions, or at least to
certain financial mechanisms, is correlated with firm characteristics that are tightly
linked with growth (age) and productivity (size). This could have implications for
output and growth in the wake of the recession. In the quantitative section of my
second chapter, I develop a model with two financial channels through which house
prices work to influence firm outcomes. This model is consistent with this differential
impact of local bank health, while at the same time capturing the extreme sensitivity
of young businesses to housing prices during the Great Recession. I show that both
channels are quantitatively important.
Second, the importance of local banking markets is confirmation of the im-
portance of geographic segmentation. While recent literature has focused on mis-
allocation induced by financial shocks on within a geographic location, this finding
suggests the potential for misallocation across geographies in the context of the
United States. In my third chapter, I develop a framework for thinking about the
relative importance of misallocation within and across geographies, as well as the
qualitative and quantitative implications of different financial shocks considered in
the literature.
My second chapter contributes to the empirical literature on financial con-
ditions facing US firms in the Great Recession by exploiting differences in local
banking conditions across states prior to the crisis. I interact this variation with
local house price shifts to proxy for the change in local banking conditions due
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to housing market developments. Consistent with previous literature (Fort et al.
(2012), Davis and Haltiwanger (2017)), I find that small businesses in general, but
in particular young businesses (who are overwhelmingly small) were impacted dis-
proportionately by house prices during the Great Recession period. However, the
interaction between house prices and local banking conditions, which I call the bank
balance sheet channel, is significant primarily for old and small firms. Taken to-
gether, the responsiveness of young firms to house prices (that cannot be attributed
to local banking conditions) and the sensitivity of old and small firms to house
prices through the bank balance sheet channel suggests that different transmission
channels are important for different firm types.
With these results in hand, I then develop a general equilibrium model that is
consistent with my empirical findings. Housing in the model is crucially related to
two financial frictions. First, housing impacts bank balance sheets in a similar way
to capital claims in the Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
frameworks. Lower house prices generate a deterioration in bank balance sheets
that in turn creates a larger spread between the lending rate in the borrowing
rate. Essentially, house prices induce a credit supply shift through the financial
intermediary. This is the banking channel. Second, similar to Decker (2015) housing
acts a collateral for businesses, both for investment and working capital (labor). As
house prices fall, the constraint tightens, restricting the ability of firms to borrow.
This is the collateral channel. I find that the banking channel is important for old
and small firms through its impact on the optimal scale of firms, while the collateral
channel is particularly important for young firms, since they are more reliant on
3
housing collateral, as opposed to business capital, early on in their life cycle.
In addition to the heterogeneous impacts of banking conditions across the
age/size distribution, the empirical work in my second chapter is also evidence of
significant financial market segmentation in the United States during the crisis.
Research has long noted potentially significant impacts of geographic segmentation
in financial markets on business cycle fluctuations and long-run misallocation (e.g.,
see Morgan et al., Gopinath et al. (2015)). More recently, the impact of such
financial market segmentation in the Great Recession was explored by Greenstone et
al. (2014), although my results suggest larger effects. I contribute to this literature
by constructing a model in which to analyze misallocation. Since the empirical
work in my second chapter is silent on the exact mechanism influenced by local
financial conditions, I explore different financial shocks that have been considered
in the literature, highlighting differences in their impact on productivity dispersion.
In a setup similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I develop a model with hetero-
geneous producers that impacted by various financial frictions, including collateral
constraint, intermediation costs, and banking relationships (subject to exogenous
separation). Importantly, the model has segmented islands, allowing me to exam-
ine differentials in financial frictions across geographies. Given the assumptions of
constant returns and isoelastic demand, dispersion in marginal revenue products is
equivalent to dispersion in distortions (or frictions) generated by the financial sector,
and so therefore of misallocation. I evaluate the relative contributions of within- and
between- island dispersion to overall dispersion (misallocation) in productivity. Ad-
ditionally, I further decompose within-island dispersion into constrained dispersion,
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relative means, and the extensive constrained/unconstrained margin.
Finally, while the empirical work in my second chapter indicates financial seg-
mentation, it is silent on the nature of the segmentation and the mechanism through
which firms are impacted by bank health. In particular, it does not indicate whether
the extension or price of credit was impacted, both of which are considered in the lit-
erature. I address this issue as well in my third chapter by exploring several financial
shocks and their implications for within-geography labor productivity dispersion. I
show that some types of financial shocks have qualitatively and quantitatively dif-
ferent implications for dispersion, providing a testable implication in the data.
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Chapter 2: Same Shock, Separate Channels: House Prices and Firm
Performance in the Great Recession
House prices in the United States collapsed by almost 20 percent from the
first quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2012. Concurrent with the housing
collapse, the US also experienced the largest financial crisis and recession since
the Great Depression, which curtailed firms’ ability to obtain credit (Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010), Adrian et al. (2013), Santos (2011)). Empirical work using
firm data from the Great Recession suggests the impact of the ensuing recession
particularly fell on young and small businesses (Fort et al. (2013)). Although
this work has established that house price shocks disproportionately impact young
and small firms, the reasons for this asymmetric effect are still largely undetermined
(Davis and Haltiwanger (2017)). In this paper I explore the connection between local
house prices and financial conditions, and how they interact to impact firms. I first
document a local bank channel through which firms are impacted by house prices,
focusing on how the impact varies by age and size. I then develop a heterogeneous
agent general equilibrium model that is consistent with my empirical findings which
features a bank credit supply channel and a collateral channel through which house
prices influence firm outcomes. In both my empirical work and my quantitative
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model, I find that the effect of the bank channel varies according to firm age and
size, suggesting different channels may be important for different firm types.
In my empirical work, I build on two strands of the literature related to the
Great Recession: research documenting financial distress driven by exposure to real
estate markets in this period and the literature exploring the role of house prices in
determining firm outcomes. The first strand links the housing crisis to the financial
crisis (e.g. Cuñat et al. (2016)). The other line of research shows that house
prices impacted young firms in particular (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger (2017)).
I contribute by connecting the variation in local house prices with local banking
conditions in order to identify a financial channel through which house prices impact
firm outcomes. I utilize the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) from the Census
Bureau, which covers the near universe of firms, in conjunction with FHFA house
price data and banking sector data from FDIC call reports. Specifically, I exploit
interactions of county-level house prices with pre-crisis bank balance sheet variables
at the state level as either regressors or instruments in firm-level growth regressions.
I find that young businesses (less than 5 years old) are sensitive to local house price
variation, but the bank balance sheet channel explains little of their performance
over the recession. On the other hand, I find meaningful effects of the bank channel
on old and small businesses (at least 5 years old and less than 500 employees).
A theoretical framework that seeks to harmonize these findings with previ-
ous evidence of a disproportionate effect of house price shocks on young businesses
requires multiple channels through which house prices impact firms. First, as iden-
tified in my empirical work, local financial conditions should interact with house
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prices to impact firms, but not necessarily young firms. Second, to explain the
disproportionate impact of house price shocks on young firms, a channel is needed
that importantly influences businesses in their early stages. One mechanism that
can potentially serve this role is a collateral channel. Recent research has found im-
portant effects of house prices on businesses through collateral and wealth channels,
focusing primarily on young businesses and entrepreneurship (Robb and Robinson
(2012), Adelino et al. (2013), Decker (2015)). If entrepreneurs can use their home
equity as collateral for obtaining finance, then house price shocks can impact their
ability to borrow by reducing the value of their collateral.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the aggregate effects of the housing crisis in
a setting that can match these results, I develop a quantitative model in which
housing appears on both bank and firm balance sheets. In this framework, bank
net worth is dependent on the value of housing. As house prices fall, bank net
worth deteriorates, tightening an internal constraint and contracting credit supply.
Housing also appears as an asset for entrepreneurs, and is an important source of
collateral for businesses to secure financing. Again, as house prices fall, collateral
constraints tighten and reduce growth. In this sector, firms differ by age, asset
holdings, and productivity, allowing me to investigate differential impacts across
the firm distribution. For firms that have not acquired business capital (young
firms), housing collateral will be important for growth.
This implies greater importance of the collateral channel for young firms, which
explains almost all of the relative decline among young firms. However, the bank
channel is also important for aggregate results, as the cost of labor and capital rises
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with the interest rate increase generated by the banking sector. Furthermore, the
model features an amplification mechanism through the mortgage rate, which also
rises due to a contraction of credit supplied by the banking sector. This leads to
a larger house price decline than would be observed in a case without endogenous
tightening in the financial sector.
Figure 2.1: Employment in the Great Recession by Firm Age/Size (Source: Author
Tabulations from the BDS)
In what follows, I discuss the literature in section 2 and my empirical analysis
of the impact of the interaction between housing values and bank balance sheets
on firm outcomes in section 3. I then detail the theoretical framework in section 4
before discussing my calibration, results, and counterfactuals in sections 5 and 6.
9
2.1 Background and Previous Literature
The expansive literature on business dynamics in the US emphasizes the rela-
tive importance of young businesses for growth. Young firms contribute dispropor-
tionately to job creation (Haltiwanger et al. (2013)), and evidence from the Great
Recession suggests that young firms were among the hardest hit by the downturn
and local house prices had a disproportionate impact on young firms (Fort et al.
(2013), Davis and Haltiwanger (2017)). While there are several promising channels
for the disproportionate impact of house prices on young businesses, there is little
evidence documenting the relative importance of such mechanisms. On the other
hand, while old small businesses contribute little to net growth on average, they
make up a much larger share of employment than young businesses. My calcula-
tions from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) show that in 2007, old/small
businesses (at least five years old and less than 500 employees) accounted for about
38 percent of employment, while young businesses comprised 14 percent of total em-
ployment. Thus, shocks that impact old/small businesses could potentially impact
aggregate outcomes more than those that impact young businesses, while shocks to
young businesses that persist might impact medium to long-run growth prospects.
To highlight these points, in Figure 2.1 I use BDS data to plot employment
among young firms (less than 5 years), old/small firms, and old/large firms (at least
500 employees, at least 5 years old). I index employment to 100 in 2007 for the
sake of comparison. Furthermore, I plot FHFA house prices over the period, again
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indexing to 100 in 2007.1 From the plot, it is clear the impact of the Great Recession
fell particularly on young firms, as employment at young firms was 24 percent lower
in 2012 than it was in 2007. Employment at old businesses dropped by about 5
percent by 2010, regardless of size. Old/large businesses recovered to their pre-
crisis level by 2012, while old/small businesses recovered, but not as quickly. The
evidence presented in this paper suggests that local house prices impacted both
young and old/small businesses substantially during the Great Recession, while
old/large businesses were largely unaffected by local house prices. However, the
mechanisms by which house prices impact firms differ.
This paper explores the local banking sector as one potential mechanism
through which house prices impact employment. A great deal of research has been
dedicated to documenting the extent of the credit supply contraction during the
Great Recession. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) provide an early assessment of
the contraction in the quantity of business lending during the financial crisis, and
Adrian et al. (2013) provide further evidence of a contraction in bank lending in
particular. Work by Santos (2011) suggests an increase in corporate interest spreads
over the course of the recession. Much of this literature focuses on the corporate
sector, while my work will take account of the near-universe of employer firms. In a
similar fashion to my paper, some of the recent literature has focused on the impact
1The peak for the quarterly series is Q2 of 2007 in the FHFA data. The date of the peak varies
in other sources, and its path varies slightly, but in general the story is broadly consistent. The
implications of this plot have furthermore been drawn out in other work (see Fort et al. (2013),
e.g.).
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of local housing markets on credit supplied by banks. Cuñat et al. (2016) focus on
the effect of bank exposure to different housing markets on lending practices. Paixao
(2017) documents the impact of house prices on bank capital and mortgage issuance
using call report data over the course of the crisis. My empirical work differs in that
I focus on house prices and their interaction with pre-crisis bank balance sheets in
affecting real firm outcomes, rather than the impact of house prices on bank port-
folios. I do this in order to capture bank “health” or “preparedness” prior to the
crisis, rather than the endogenous response of bank health to the crisis, which could
be correlated with firm performance. In this regard, my work follows that of Cole et
al. (2012) which shows the predictive power of a set of bank balance sheet ratios on
bank failure during this period. By focusing on a single snapshot of bank balance
sheets in 2005, I extend the spirit of this line of reasoning to investigate the impact
of pre-crisis bank preparedness on real outcomes.
Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Greenstone et al. (2016), which are closely related
to this paper, document the impact of banking market variation for firm outcomes,
concurring on a large decline in credit supply but differing on the real effect on
employment. Similar to Greenstone et al. (2016), I utilize administrative data for
the United States, but unlike their work, I exploit firm-level rather than county-level
variation in order to explore underlying heterogeneity of credit supply effects across
the firm distribution. On the other hand, Chodorow-Reich (2014) is primarily made
up of relatively large firms. I am able to consider a more comprehensive set of firms
that is more representative of both the age and size distribution. Both papers focus
on large lenders as well, whereas my focus will be on “local” banks which are more
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exposed to local house prices than large banks. As in Chodorow-Reich (2014), I
emphasize differences across size and age, but note that the results differ from those
observed in that paper, which could be attributed to the very different samples
used. Greenstone et al. (2016) do not focus on hetereogeneous responses across
the age and size distribution, as I do, and instead primarily consider county-level
employment changes in response to their instrument for large bank credit supply.
This paper also builds on a long line of theoretical and quantitative work that
explores the impact of financial frictions on real outcomes both over the long run
and over the business cycle. This literature has posited constraints that fall directly
on firms (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Cooley et al. (2004)), and frictions that
inhibit the efficient intermediation of funds by the financial sector and create a shift
in credit supply (Gertler and Karadi (2011)). My paper incorporates both types of
frictions. Recent literature that explores the long-run impact of frictions in busi-
ness credit markets in the form of a collateral constraint on the firm includes Buera
et al. (2011), who attribute much of the difference in country-level development
to financial frictions. Midrigan and Xu (2014) find in the context of their model
that collateral-style constraints may not be as important, while Moll (2014) argues
they may still matter along transition paths if shocks are persistent. Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) explore the impact of a “credit crunch” in a DSGE framework, while
Buera and Moll (2015) stress the importance of accounting for heterogeneity across
firms (a feature of my model). Khan and Thomas (2013) also find quantitative
importance of a credit crunch in a setting with decreasing returns to scale among
heterogeneous producers and time-to-build assumptions in investment choices, two
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characteristics of the environment facing firms in my model. In general, these pa-
pers consider shocks or changes to the collateral constraint itself. While my model
features a tightening in collateral constraints, it is through housing values rather
than an actual change in the collateral parameter.
Other models focus on the role of the financial sector in generating tightened
credit conditions via an interest rate shock (consistent with evidence from Santos
(2011) and Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012)), rather than a collateral constraint shock.
Several papers consider exogenous “spread shocks” where intermediation costs rise
mechanically, including Chodorow-Reich (2014), Ajello (2016), and Decker (2015).
Boissay et al. (2016) develop a model with frictions in the interbank market that
produce increased costs of financing in crisis. My paper closely follows the work of
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) by imposing an internal
incentive constraint in the banking sector. Rather than expose the bank to capital
quality or productivity shocks through equity claims on capital, as is done in those
papers, this paper exposes banks to house price shocks through equity in housing.
This connects the financial crisis to housing, generating an endogenous tightening
in credit conditions in response to a house price shock.
In contrast to much of the theoretical literature, in my main experiment I
do not shock any financial parameters, but rather change housing preferences and
allow asset and collateral values to move endogenously as a result. Furthermore, I do
not shock productivity, leaving the productive capacity of the economy unchanged.
Still, the model generates a recession without either of these types of shocks, as
falling housing values impact firms through the bank’s incentive constraint and the
14
collateral value of the housing stock. These results do not preclude the possibility of
shifts in financial parameters or declines in productivity, but serve to highlight the
potential of financial frictions in the firm and bank problems for amplifying shocks.
While other mechanisms through which house prices disproportionately impact
young businesses have been proposed in addition to a bank channel (see Hurst and
Pugsley (2015), for an example), I focus in my quantitative analysis on a collateral
channel. Intuitively, if entrepreneurs rely on housing collateral early in their life
cycle to obtain external finance, the impact of house prices could disproportionately
impact them in the early stages of their business by tightening collateral constraints.
Evidence for the importance of personal guarantees and collateral are apparent in
both the Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) and the Kaufman Firm Survey
(KFS). Avery et al. (1998) stress the importance of personal guarantees in obtaining
finance in the SSBF, and to a lesser extent Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs),
for firms organized as limited liability corporations. For single proprietorships and
partnerships, credit worthiness is implicitly tied to the net worth of the owner,
while LLC’s need to provide additional guarantees for personal wealth (and therefore
home values) to be important. More recently, Robb and Robinson (2012) also stress
the irrelevance of distinguishing between personal and business loans for non-LLC
businesses in the KFS, but further note the prominence of personal loans in their
sample, making up over a third of external financing among firms that borrow.
Furthermore, they find that firms in areas with a higher housing supply elasticity
(an instrument I use in my analysis) are able to borrow more, suggesting that more
stable home values could supply a better source of collateral for firms. Adelino
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et al. (2015) provide supporting evidence for this channel by showing that small
businesses grew disproportionately in areas with larger house price increases over
the boom. Furthermore they emphasize that these effects were particularly strong
in industries that are more reliant on housing as collateral.
Given these findings, I incorporate housing as collateral value in a similar
fashion to Decker (2015). This paper shows the importance of the impact of housing
values on entrepreneurship and firm entry, while noting the importance of a credit
spread shock in generating the aggregate outcomes observed in the Great Recession.
My model differs in that entry is exogenous, but I allow credit spreads to respond
to the housing shock, connecting both mechanisms to a single shock. Even without
endogenous entry, the mechanism impacts young firm employment as entrants start
with relatively little business capital, and are thus more reliant on their housing for
collateral. As the firm accumulates business capital that can be collateralized, they
can more easily weather shocks to housing collateral values.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
In what follows, I discuss my strategy for identifying a channel through which
house prices affect financial conditions businesses face. In brief, the strategy con-
siders the interaction of house price declines over the 2007-2012 period with bank
balance sheet variables prior to that period. In particular, I explore whether indi-
cators of the structure of the bank balance sheet in a state prior to the decline in
house prices interact to influence firm outcomes like employment.
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At the heart of the strategy are interaction terms of annual house prices
changes with the indicators of bank balance sheets. By focusing on balance sheets
prior to the crisis, I am relying on an assumption that bank balance sheet struc-
ture, and bank health in general, prior to 2007 did not anticipate the subsequent
declines in housing prices over the Great Recession. Additionally, there must be dis-
proportionate exposure of local banks to local house prices, and that exposure has
a significant impact on bank health. If these assumptions hold, local house prices
impact banks, in turn restricting their lending and influencing business outcomes.
Then, the interaction of house prices with the pre-crisis bank balance sheets would
serve as a proxy for changes in credit conditions.
In several specifications, I consider various interactions of house prices with
bank balance sheets on employment outcomes at businesses distinguishing between
“direct effects” (inclusive of demand, collateral, and other effects not working through
the financial sector) and the “bank balance sheet” effect. I first discuss the data,
and my construction of the dataset, before considering each specification in turn.
2.2.1 Data
I combine data in the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) from the US Cen-
sus Bureau with public data on bank balance sheets from FDIC call reports, house
price data from FHFA, and unemployment data from the BLS. For the vast major-
ity of firms in the US economy, financial data is difficult to obtain. Most datasets
cover large and publicly traded firms, and even then little is known about lenders
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or lending relationships.2 Although the advantage of this paper is its coverage of
the US economy, I ultimately must rely on geographic matching with banking data
to characterize the lending environment of the firm. This relies on assumptions of
financial geographic segmentation. Based on data from the Survey of Small Business
Finances (SSBF), most small businesses borrow from nearby banks (Petersen and
Rajan (2002), Brevoort et al. (2009)), and theoretical research has shown that dis-
tance to lender can matter for the acquisition of soft information (Boot and Thakor
(1994), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)). This, along with the evidence of banking
relationships and their quantitative impact in normal times and over the business cy-
cle (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Boualam (2015), Chodorow-Reich (2014)), makes it
plausible that such segmentation is important. My results corroborate such a view,
as local banking conditions appear to impact firms (in particular old/small firms).
The LBD is an annual dataset derived from administrative records that cov-
ers the near-universe of establishments in the US economy. The dataset includes a
measure of employees and revenue as of March 12 of the year, making it possible
to create employment and labor productivity measures on an annual basis. Fur-
thermore, the dataset contains data on location, industry, and multi-unit status.
Importantly, an age variable can be constructed. I focus on employment data for
now, leaving the analysis of revenue productivity for later work.3 In the analysis I
2See Dinlersöz et al. (2017) for an example of a paper that uses the ORBIS dataset to cover
a larger portion of small and young firms. See Chodorow-Reich (2014) for research documenting
banking relationships among generally large firms with data derived from the syndicated loan
market.
3Further detail on the data construction process for the LBD, including cleaning, can be found
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conduct, I focus on employment growth at the local level within a firm, splitting the
sample by firm characteristics. In other words, the unit of observation in each speci-
fication is a firm’s establishments within a county and industry. In essence, this is a
modified notion of establishment where individual establishments are aggregated if
they share an owner, industry, and county. This allows me to focus on the response
of the firm to local shocks impacting its establishments, without overweighting firms
with multiple establishments in a county/industry bin. Consistent with this notion,
I split the sample by firm age and size, highlighting differential impacts across the
firm age/size distribution. To simplify exposition, I will refer to the unit of obser-
vation as an establishment outcome, although the reader should keep in mind the
modification made to the concept.4
To develop a measure of financial conditions in the local market of the es-
tablishment, I use data from the FDIC call report database. These data cover the
entirety of insured institutions in the United States, providing detailed information
on assets, liabilities, ownership structure, locations, and ownership history. The
in the data appendix of Haltiwanger et al. (2016).
4For each specification, I also report results using firm-level outcomes in the appendix. These
results are broadly consistent. However, the presence of multi-establishment firms (in particular
firms that branch across county borders) require an assumption on location of the firm. I choose
the county based on modal employment, or the county with the largest share of employment at
the firm. This likely introduces measurement error, as larger firms will be influenced by various
house price shocks and financial conditions outside of those in the modal county. Focusing on
establishment growth rates split by firm characteristics, as I do in the main text, solves this
problem.
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data are available on a quarterly basis, but I take averages over the year to create
an annual dataset. I roll up banks to the ownership level, or bank holding company
level. In order to make these data consistent with the theory of financial market
segmentation mentioned above, I restrict myself to banks that only have branches
in one state. Although I would like to be able to consider smaller markets than the
state level, it is difficult to allocate assets for multi-county banks to their branches,
and restricting myself to single branch banks would limit the sample too much.
Therefore, I focus on single-state banks, which are still very common and provide
me with enough variation over the business cycle to estimate the effect of local
banking markets.
These banks are as small as several million dollars in assets up to large com-
munity banks of well over a billion dollars. Figure 2.2 provides an example of the
relative importance of these banks, as they have accounted for roughly 10% of busi-
ness loans over the last decade, but over 30% of small business loans. Given the
theoretical background of financial market segmentation, small business lending is
likely the more important function.5
I then roll each of the variables of interest up to the state level, creating a
representative “state bank balance sheet” to characterize the variation in local bank
balance sheet structure across states. Next, I obtain house price data from the
5I clean the data further, removing large banks, such as credit card companies, that only have
one reported branch, but are obviously not local state banks. Due to the small number of state
banks in Delaware, the District of Columbia, and New Hampshire, I merge these states with
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Vermont, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Importance of Single-State Banks in Small Business Lending (Source:
Author’s Calculations from the FDIC Call Report Data)
FHFA at the county level and unemployment at the county and state level from the
BLS. Since my focus is on the period of national house price decline from the second
quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2012, I use year-over-year changes in either
the second quarter or June, depending on frequency, for each series. Finally I use
instruments from Saiz (2010) on county housing price elasticities, which I discuss in
more detail in the next section.
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2.2.2 Empirical Framework
I develop an empirical model which captures the impact of house prices on
firms through banks based on the shape of their pre-crisis bank balance sheet. I
consider three approaches to capture the effect of house prices through a bank
balance sheet channel. First, I consider a simple framework where I directly include
the interaction between house prices and the mortgage share of bank balance sheets
in a firm growth regression. This has the advantage of being easily interpretable
and theoretically consistent with a model of deteriorating asset values induced by
a decline in house prices. However, it is perhaps too narrowly focused on a single
asset to truly characterize pre-crisis “bank health”.
Second, I consider a two-stage setup where bank health is proxied by bank exit,
which can be impacted by house price declines. Since bank health is a complicated
multi-dimensional object that depends on several balance sheet factors, it is difficult
to develop a “bank health” index. However, I can observe bank exit over the period
I am investigating. Since bank exit is an endogenous variable to firm performance,
I develop a predictive model of bank exit in my first stage with bank balance sheet
variables interacted with house prices on the right hand side.6 In a sense, predicted
6See the appendix for a list of the bank balance sheet variables used. I follow Cole and White
(2012) in my choice of balance sheet variables, which include asset ratios, liability/asset ratios,
and profitability measures. I use a snapshot in 2005, to maintain plausibility that the shock is
unexpected, rather than a rolling window of asset ratios as the authors do. Furthermore, I create
a state-level bank balance sheet, rather than an individual bank balance sheet, since ultimately
my identification is based on geography.
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bank exit acts as an index for the interaction of house prices with bank balance
sheets, with the first stage generating the index in this two-stage setup.
Finally, I introduce a framework where the entire set of bank balance sheet
interactions used as instruments in the bank balance sheet approach are directly in-
cluded in the firm growth equation. This has the advantage of potentially capturing
broader effects beyond bank exit or the interaction of house prices with one asset
ratio. However, interpretability is more difficult in this case, as the cumulative ef-
fect of the regressors is the object of interest, not necessarily individual coefficients.
Furthermore, it is difficult to instrument for house prices in such a setting, so I focus
on the results from a simple OLS regression.
In what follows, I establish the correlation between housing values and firm
performance briefly before discussing each of the above approaches in turn. However,
one must also note the potential endogeneity in house prices. To account for this,
I include additional instrumental variable regressions with the interaction of state-
level unemployment rates interacting with county house price elasticities developed
from Saiz (2010). This provides a plausibly exogenous instrument for house prices
(supposing state-level changes in unemployment can be taken as exogenous to firm
growth). Note that these elasticities are only available for counties in metro areas.
In light of this, I report both regressions with house price changes to maintain
complete geographic coverage and instrumented house price changes to plausibly
claim exogeneity.7
7See the appendix for further discussion of alternative explanations which I seek to address in
future work.
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2.2.2.1 House Prices and Employment Growth
Before discussing the mortgage share approach, I first establish the correlation
between house price growth and firm-level employment growth in the Great Reces-
sion. Specifically, I run a simple regression of the establsihment e′s employment
growth ∆Ye,t as calculated in Davis et al. (1996), henceforth DHS growth rates,
from time t− 1 to t on the log change in county c house prices ∆HPIc,t from t− 1
to t:8
∆Ye,t = γ∆URc,t + γ∆URs,t + β1∆HPIc,t + αc + δt + τi + sizee,t + εe,t (2.1)
I have included time effects δt and county fixed effects αc, as well as the change
in the county unemployment rate ∆URc,t. I also include industry fixed effects τi
and the log of the denominator of the DHS growth rate as a size control. Since I
consider broader implications of state bank balance sheets, I include an indicator of
state unemployment rate changes ∆URs,t for completeness. I cluster at the county
level. Due to the apparent nonlinearities in age and size, as stressed by Fort et al.
(2013) and Dinlersöz et al. (2017), the results are broken out by three categories:
young (less than 5 years old), old/small (at least 5 years old and less than 500
employees), and old/large (at least 500 employees). In general, I expect there to
be substantive differences between these groups, as older businesses have had time
to form financial relationships, and larger businesses have access to broader capital
8DHS growth rates are calculated as the change in employment over the average of employment
in the two periods. Formally, ∆Yt =
Yt−Yt−1
(Yt+Yt−1)/2
. I use the denominator as the control for size in
the regressions in this paper.
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markets and furthermore may not be as sensitive to local conditions. The results
for the overall sample along with these breakouts are included in Table 2.1.
Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
4 HPI 0.1317*** 0.1744*** 0.1017*** 0.0179
(0.0249) (0.0350) (0.0238) (0.0132)
N 26,440,000 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
IV
4 HPI 0.1944*** 0.2150*** 0.1298*** -0.0421
(0.0431) (0.0607) (0.0476) (0.0398)
N 18,520,000 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table 2.1: Employment Growth Regressions on House Prices. Note: Young < 5yo,
Old>=5 yo, Small <500 employees, Large >=500 employees; includes log(DHS denom-
inator), county effects, industry effects, time effects, and changes in county and state
unemployment rates. 4ĤPI indicates house prices instrumented by changes in state
unemployment interacted with Saiz elasticities. See appendix for R2 and first-stage tests.
The results show a strongly significant relationship between house prices and
employment growth for establishments of young and old/small firms. The result
is also consistent with the notion that large businesses are less sensitive to local
conditions, as employment growth at large businesses is uncorrelated with house
price growth. I then instrument house prices with the Saiz housing price elasticity
interacted with the change in state unemployment rates, including the change in the
state unemployment rate as an additional control. These results, at the bottom of
Table 2.1, show an increased point estimate that is still significant for both young
and old/small.
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2.2.2.2 Mortgage Share Approach
Given this relationship in my data, which is consistent with previous work
connecting house prices to firm performance, I introduce an additional term that
serves to highlight the influence of banking conditions on the impact of house prices
on firm growth. This specification is a simple OLS regression similar to the previous
specification, but with the addition of an interaction between house prices and the
share of mortgages on state bank balance sheets.
∆Ye,t = γ∆URc,t + γ∆URs,t + β1∆HPIc,t + β2∆HPIc,t ∗MTGs,2005 (2.2)
+αc + δt + τi + sizee,t + εe,t
Intuitively, it makes sense that a bank with a high mortgage ratio would
be more sensitive to house price changes, so simply including the interaction with
mortgage ratios could highlight the effect of bank balance sheets. To get a sense
of the underlying variation in the data (although I subsequently normalize all bank
balance sheet variables to make them mean zero for interpretation purposes), in
Figure 2.3 I plot state-level mortgage shares against state-level average house price
declines over the 2007-2012 period. There is a fair amount of variation in mortgage
shares. Some states have local banks with 30 percent of their assets allocated to
mortgages, while other have very little.9
9Interestingly, the four states with the largest house price declines have some of the lowest
mortgage shares, and the overall relationship appears to be negative. While a lower mortgage
share would theoretically make these states less susceptible to house price declines, keep in mind
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Figure 2.3: Pre-Crisis Mortgage Share and 2007-12 HPI Growth (Source: FHFA
and FDIC)
Table 2.2 presents the results from the regression. Again, I instrument for
house prices as before, and further instrument the interaction of house prices and
mortgage shares with interactions between housing price elasticities, state unem-
ployment rate changes, and the mortgage share. However, this time I include inter-
actions with the quadratic and cubic of the change in state unemployment, as the
first stage is underidentified in the linear case. My first stage thus consists of house
that mortgages are generally positively correlated with better bank health. Furthermore, bank
health is a complex object, and a single component of bank balance sheets will not likely capture
the full extent of their preparedness for a crisis. Thus, while the mortgage share is useful due to
its close connection with house prices, low mortgage shares do not necessarily indicate a bank that
will weather house price shocks well.
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prices and their interaction with pre-crisis mortgage share as endogenous variables
regressed on the following instruments: (log) elasticity of county house prices ηc
, the quadratic η2c , and the cubic term η
3
c interacted with 4URs,t, as well as the
interaction of ηc with4URs,t and the mortgage share MTGs,2005, η2c interacted with
4URs,t and MTGs,2005, and η3c interacted with 4URs,t and MTGs,2005.
Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
4 HPI 0.2618*** 0.1512*** 0.0155
(0.0373) (0.0184) (0.0181)
4 HPI* 0.1031*** 0.0610*** -0.0032
MTG RATIO (0.0333) (0.0203) (0.0161)
N 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
Total IV
4 HPI 0.3275** 0.2767*** 0.0340
(0.1281) (0.0859) (0.0933)
4 HPI* 0.1327 0.1522** 0.0937
MTG RATIO (0.1085) (0.0771) (0.0853)
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table 2.2: Employment Growth Regressions on House Prices and Mortgage Share Inter-
actions. Note: Young < 5yo, Old>=5 yo, Small <500 employees, Large >=500 employees;
includes log(DHS denominator), county effects, industry effects, time effects, and changes
in county and state unemployment rates. IV regression instruments for both house prices
and interaction with mortgage share. See appendix for R2 and first-stage tests.
The results show a similar pattern to the tables in the previous section. House
prices appear to have a large effect on young businesses in both the OLS and IV spec-
ification. Although the interaction with mortgage shares is significant in the OLS
specification, I cannot reject the null under the IV specification. On the other hand,
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there is a significant response of employment among establishments of old/small
firms in response to house prices and their interaction with mortgage shares in both
specifications. This supports the notion that a higher mortgage share among state
banks impacts older firms since those banks could be more sensitive to house price
shocks. As before, it is apparent that old/large businesses are largely unaffected by
house price shocks.
2.2.2.3 Bank Exit Approach
Bank health is a complicated object, and a single variable will likely not cap-
ture this multidimensionality. As a step toward incorporating a broader scope of
bank balance sheets, I consider the propensity for banks to exit in a particular year
as an indicator of overall bank health in the state. That is, I include as a regressor
the exit rate of banks weighted by total assets BEs,t in the state s in which county
c is located, either by failure or acquisition:10
∆Ye,t = γ∆URc,t + β1∆HPIc,t + β2BEs,t + αc + δt + τi + sizee,t + εe,t (2.3)
Again, I run this regression separately by young firms, old/small firms, and
old/large firms. One would expect that increasing house prices would generally be
associated with increasing employment, and an increased bank exit share should
negatively impact employment. The first two rows of Table 2.3 seem to confirm
10While failure is a clear sign of distress, and exit in normal times is not necessarily a sign of
distress, it is reasonable to assume the tremendous increases in both failures and exits are likely
due to distress given the financial environment in the time frame considered.
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this result, with employment strongly correlated with housing prices, and bank exit
negatively correlated with employment growth. The impact of house prices and
bank exit vary across size/age categories, as establishments of young firms appear
more sensitive to the direct effect of house prices, while establishments of old/large
firms are largely unaffected. The bank exit effect seems to impact establishments of
old/small firms, but the coefficient for establishments of young firms is not signifi-
cant.
Clearly bank exit is endogenous to firm performance, so I need to instrument
bank exit. As discussed before, I use the county-level housing price elasticities from
Saiz (2010) to instrument for house prices in the second section of Table 2.3. I
instrument bank exit with the interaction of house prices with bank balance sheet
variables of state banks in 2005. These variables have been shown in Cole and White
(2012) to predict bank failure, and fixing the time frame in 2005 plausibly resolves
endogeneity issues between outcomes in the Great Recession and bank portfolio
choices. Since these indicators are fixed across time, I interact them with house
prices to obtain predicted bank exit share via house prices interacting with pre-crisis
bank balance sheets. Since house prices are controlled for in the main regression,
what is left can only be attributed to the influence of house prices on bank balance
sheets. These results are displayed in the bottom of Table 2.3. When either house
prices or bank exit is instrumented, the main results remain. The point estimates
for the instrumented variable typically increases in absolute magnitude, while the
standard errors also increase.




4 HPI 0.1740*** 0.1003*** 0.0177
(0.0351) (0.0236) (0.0132)
Bank Exit -0.0107 -0.0456*** -0.0109
(0.0209) (0.0118) (0.0137)
N 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
Instrumented HPI
4 ˆHPI 0.2146*** 0.1294*** -0.0425
(0.0606) (0.0472) (0.0398)
Bank Exit -0.0185 -0.0504*** -0.0113
(0.0229) (0.0134) (0.0169)
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Inst. HPI & Bank Exit
4 ˆHPI 0.1765*** 0.1374*** -0.0519
(0.0437) (0.0402) (0.0361)
B̂E -0.0524 -0.2304*** -0.1941*
(0.1803) (0.0874) (0.1038)
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table 2.3: Employment Growth Regressions on House Prices and State Bank Exit Share.
Note: Young < 5yo, Old>=5 yo, Small <500 employees, Large >=500 employees; includes
log(DHS denominator), county effects, industry effects, time effects, and changes in county
and state unemployment rates.4ĤPI indicates house prices instrumented by changes in
state unemployment interacted with Saiz elasticities. See appendix for R2 and first-stage
tests.
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action of house prices with bank balance sheet variables only impact firm growth
through bank exit? Deterioration in bank health due to house price decline could
cause a decline in lending but not necessarily an exit. That is, the effect of house
prices on local financial conditions is broader than bank exit. In the next section, I
consider an approach that would account for broader effects.
Figure 2.4: Multivariate Regressions: Effect of 5% HPI Change on DHS Employment
Growth via Bank Effect, Old/Small Firms
2.2.2.4 Full Bank Balance Sheet Approach
As discussed before, bank health is a multi-dimensional object, and one bal-
ance sheet variable will likely have a hard time capturing such a complex object.
32
Figure 2.5: Multivariate Regressions: Effect of 5% HPI Change on DHS Employment
Growth via Bank Effect, Young Firms
Rather than restrict myself to a single variable, or channeling the balance sheet
effect through an outcome like bank exit, I turn to a specification where the full set
of house price and bank balance sheet interactions is included in the main regression
equation. The advantage here is that it captures a broader effect than bank exit and
is more comprehensive than relying on the mortgage ratio. However, the output is
difficult to interpret, especially in table form.
Instead, I plot the total effect of house prices and their interaction with bank
balance sheets for each state (given the average house price decline in the state),
distinguishing between the direct effect of house prices and the effect of the interac-
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Figure 2.6: Multivariate Regressions: Effect of 5% HPI Change on DHS Employment
Growth via Bank Effect, Old/Large Firms
tion terms. I first plot firm DHS growth rate responses for each individual state to
a common house price decline of 5%, which is roughly in line with annual national
house price declines during the Great Recession. Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 show
the impact of the bank balance sheet interaction effect on the youg, old/small, and
old/large groups, respectively.
In general, these graphs show a picture of substantial impacts of the bank
balance sheet effect for both all categories of firms. However, they appear qualita-
tively different. Focusing on the old/small group, the figure shows that bank balance
sheets vary enough to produce notable differences across states: some states’ bank
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Figure 2.7: Multivariate Regressions: Effect of Average State-Level HPI Change on
DHS Employment Growth, Old/Small Firms
balance sheets create an “amplification” effect as employment declines by an addi-
tional 1 percent, and some state bank balance sheets mitigated the effect of house
price declines by as much as1 percent. Furthermore, some of the states with the
largest declines in house prices (Nevada, Arizona, and Florida) seem to have bank
balance sheets that contribute to the shock.
Among young firms, the range is even larger, with some states reporting a
predicted decline of over 2 percent. However the largest significant effects seem to
mitigate the effect of house price declines, with several predicted increases of over
8 percent due to the decline in house prices. Given these are concentrated in states
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Figure 2.8: Multivariate Regressions: Effect of Average State-Level HPI Change on
Firm-level DHS Employment Growth, Young Firms
with large declines, this seems unlikely.
The response of establishments at old/large firms looks similar to establish-
ments of old/small firms in terms of magnitudes, but like young firms, the bank
effect is mitigating much of the impact of house prices on establishments in states
with large house price declines. Thus, while bank balance sheet effects vary more
across states for young firms, and there are similar effects across the size dimension
for old firms, the bank effect doesn’t seem to be contributing as much to the decline
in employment in states with large house price declines for the young and old/large
groups.
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Figure 2.9: Multivariate Regressions: Effect of Average State-Level HPI Change on
DHS Employment Growth, Old/LargeFirms
To demonstrate this, I show in Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 both the effect of
the change in house prices via the interaction term (called the Bank Balance Sheet
effect) and the cumulative effect of the interaction and the direct effect of house
prices. In these charts, I use the average house price decline in each state rather
than a common house price decline, so each state’s predicted values are the result of
“actual” house price declines in the state and interactions with state bank balance
sheets.11
11To establish the significance of the results, I perform F-tests on the joint significance of the
sum of all coefficients, properly signed for the direction of the point estimate (that is, I add positive
coefficients and subtract negative coefficients). This is a more restrictive test than simply testing
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From these figures, it is more clear that bank balance sheets seem to be con-
tributing a substantial amount to the overall decline in employment among old/small
firms due to house price declines. For young firms, although the overall and bank
balance sheet effects of house prices are larger, the bank balance sheet effect ap-
pears to have less explanatory power for overall growth in employment among young
firms due to house price declines over the Great Recession and subsequent recovery.
Among establishments at old/large firms, the effect of house prices is largely trans-
mitted through the bank channel, but again it does not seem to be contributing to
declines in the hardest hit states.
Overall, the results consistently point to a significant impact of local bank
balance sheet structure on the sensitivity of old and small businesses to house price
changes. I interpret this as a local bank channel that is reflective of house prices
impacting old/small firms through local financial intermediaries. The effect of this
channel on young firms appears to be weak at most, although house prices are still
important for predicting firm outcomes. In my theoretical work, I seek to construct
a model to match these facts, focusing on the differential impact of house prices on
young vs. old firms.12
the hypothesis that all coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Inclusive of the main
effect of house prices, the joint test F-stat is 39.0 (p-value of 0.000) for young, 22.3 (0.000) for
old/small, and 9.91 (0.002) for old/large. Considering only the interactions, the joint F-stat is 27.1
(0.000) for young, 19.0 (0.000) for old, and 9. (0.002) for old/large.
12In the appendix, I note some alternative explanations for the relationships I demonstrate.
One potential interpretation is to suggest that the young/old distinction is driven by differential
demand. I show in appendix D the results of similar regressions for the tradable sector defined
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2.3 General Equilibrium Model Outline
I now turn to a general equilibrium model to quantify the impact of a collapse
in house prices on firm performance across the age distribution and on aggregate
outcomes. The relevant channels for house prices to impact firms, in addition to
general equilibrium effects, will be a bank credit supply channel and a collateral
channel. As part of the exercises I undertake to evaluate the importance of each
channel, I consider alternative regimes in which I shut off each of the channels to
evaluate their importance in influencing aggregates and their relative importance
across the distribution of firms.
The model consists of three types of agents: a representative household; a
continuum of entrepreneurs/ producers who are heterogeneous in productivity and
portfolio holdings; and financial intermediaries, which I call banks, who take deposits
from the household and lend to entrepreneurs.
The representative household is fairly standard. It consumes nondurable goods
and housing services both from owner-occupied houses and rental housing. It saves
in the form of bond, which serves as deposits for the bank. This sector will be the
source of the housing shock, as house prices will fall due to a shift in household
preferences.
in Mian and Sufi (2014). I find that house prices have an important impact on young firms even
in this sector, consistent with evidence in Davis and Haltiwanger (2017). Furthermore the bank
balance sheet channel is present under the bank exit specification for these sectors. I do not find
a significant impact of the mortgage interaction for any firm age/size group.
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The key assumptions lie in the entrepreneurial sector and financial sector. En-
trepreneurs produce using labor, which they hire from the household, and capital,
which they need to accumulate over their life cycle. The accumulation of capital and
hiring of labor are both impeded by financial frictions. In particular a collateral re-
quirement potentially prohibits them from borrowing as much as they desire. Their
constraint is dependent on their assets, since they are able to borrow against their
own capital and, crucially, household equity in housing. Additionally, there are lim-
ited life cycle dynamics in that entrepreneurs are born exogenously and are subject
to an exogenous death shock, which are standard. New entrants are endowed with
business capital κe, guaranteeing them the ability to produce in the first period.
The banking sector also plays an important role in propagating shifts in the
change in housing preferences. Banks take deposits which they invest in three assets:
mortgages, business loans, and rental housing. The key assumptions in this sector of
the model is the exposure to house prices through its endowment and its ownership of
rental housing as an asset on its portfolio. Banks are endowed with the replacement
level of housing δh and liquid wealth, which they can leverage to fund asset purchases.
However, an internal incentive compatability constraint limits the extent to which
they can leverage their assets. In response to a housing shock, the bank will have
lower initial net worth, based on its endowment, and its preferences for owning
housing will change. This leads to shifts in portfolio choice and a tightening in the
constraint, which in turn leads to tighter lending conditions for the household and
businesses. In addition to the direct impact this has on firm output, it also drives
up mortgage rates, leading to a sharper decline in house prices and even tighter
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conditions.
In what follows, I describe household problem, the entrepreneur problem, the
final goods producer’s problem, and the financial intermediaries’ problem in turn
before defining an equilibrium.
2.3.1 Household Problem
The household maximizes utility over consumption C, leisure l, owner-occupied
housing H, and rental housing HR. It provides labor L = 1− l to producers at wage
w. The household also saves by buying bonds B at price q which implies a de-
posit rate r in for the banking sector. Furthermore, each household must borrow






βU(Ct, 1− Lt, Ht, HR,t) (2.4)
s.t.
Ct+ qt+1Bt+1 +Rh,tHR,t+ qh,t+1(Ht+1− (1− δH)Ht) = Bt+wtLt+M ′− (1 + rm)φM
(2.5)
and
qh,t+1(Ht+1 − (1− δH)Ht) ≤Mt+1 (2.6)
In the budget constraint, we see that consumption (Ct), new bond purchases (Bt+1),
rental housing (HR,t), and new owner-occupied housing (Ht+1) are purchased with
proceeds from previous period savings (Bt), wages (wtLt). Additionally, mortgages
Mt are required to purchase homes, and factor into the budget constraint. Consider
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a case where preferences are additively separable and CRRA. Then the formula can
be re-written recursively as:















1−σh + βV (B′, H ′,M ′)
s.t.
C + q′B′+ q′h(H
′− (1− δH)H) +RhHR ≤ B+wL+M ′− (1 + rm)φM − q′B′ (2.8)
and
q′H(H
′ − (1− δH)H) ≤M ′ (2.9)
Optimization implies the following:
νl(1− L)−σL = wC−σc (2.10)
νH(εH
1
































The first equation governs the consumption-leisure tradeoff, the second governs the
rental utility consumption tradeoff, and the third is the standard intertemporal
Euler equation. Finally, the fourth equation represents the tradeoff between the
cost of buying housing today and the benefit buying brings tomorrow: utility from
housing and capital gains from price and borrowing rate changes. That is, higher
expected prices tomorrow encourages borrowing today.
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Assume for simplicity that σL = 0. Then, steady state versions of the above
can be re-written to relate house prices to rental rates and the ratio of owner-
occupied housing to rental housing:
qh =
Rh










Rental rates and interest rates will be pinned down with the addition of a banking
sector and housing supply (which will be inelastic).
2.3.2 Entrepreneurs
In each period a measure 1 continuum of entrepreneurs produce a unique
variety i of the intermediate good. These entrepreneurs can borrow for working
capital and in an interperiod bond against current capital holdings k housing as
collateral qhHo which is taken as given from the household problem. There is a time
to build assumption, in that capital is purchased at the end of a period but installed
next period after the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. In addition to intraperiod
working capital loans, the entrepreneur also has access to an interperiod bond, as
the household does, which they can use to either save or borrow. The producer’s
problem is given by:
V (zi, k, b) = max
c,`,k′,h
ln(c) + βζE [V (z′i, k
′, b′)] (2.15)
The producer maximizes over consumption, labor, loans, and future capital subject
to the following budget constraint:
c+ k′ + q(b′)b′ = pizik
αh1−α + (1− δ)k + b− (1 + r`)` (2.16)
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Where the first term on the right hand size is a Cobb-Douglas production function
with constant returns multiplied by a product specific price. Capital evolves in the
typical fashion: k′ = (1 − δ)k + i, where i is investment. Intertemporal debt b′ is
chosen at the end of the period, and ` is the amount of working capital loans taken
out of the producer. The amount of wages paid to workers and investment for future
periods must be financed by working capital (i.e., ` = wh, where w is the wage rate
and h is hours). Both intertemporal debt and intratemporal working capital loans
are governed by a collateral constraint (note that intertemporal debt chosen in this
period is constrained by next period’s collateral constraint). I assume that there is
a sense in which entrepreneurs are a part of the household, so they have access to
homeowner equity. They can use some portion ξh of the home value owned by the
household, which they use this as collateral to obtain finance in order to fund their
business.13
(1 + r`)` ≤

ξ(1− δ)k + ξhqh(1− δh)H + b, b ≤ 0
ξ(1− δ)k + ξhqh(1− δh)H, b > 0
(2.17)
Furthermore, I need to specify an AR(1) process for the firm TFP process:
log(z′i) = ν + ϕlog(zi) + ε ε ∼ N(0, σ) (2.18)
From this problem, we can see the impact of house prices and financial variables
13I motivate this from evidence in Robb and Robinson (2012), who show that personal finance
is an important source of external finance for entrepreneurs. However, roughly a third of financing
comes in the form of a personal finance loan. Although the distinction for sole proprietorships and
partnerships between personal and business loans is fuzzy, I take this as evidence that personal
wealth is less “collateralizable.”
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on firm outcomes. The interest rate directly impacts both employment through
working capital requirement, and the incentive to accumulate capital via the budget
constraint in (2.16). This second effect in turn should lead to lower capital, which
can potentially tighten (2.17) in future periods, thereby reducing credit demand.
To the extent that house prices influence interest rates, which is established in the
next section, they can shift the optimal scale for firms and effect the tightness of the
collateral constraint, changing output and employment. Furthermore, house prices
directly impact the collateral constraint, regardless of fluctuations in the interest
rate. In my results section, I explore which of these effects matter for which firms,
as well as aggregate outcomes.
With probability 1 − ζ the firm dies, outstanding debts are collected, and
remaining capital is scrapped. A new measure of 1 − ζ firms are then exogenously
born each period to keep unit mass. These new firms are allocated a small amount κe
of capital as an endowment. They are able to borrow immediately against housing
and capital endowments, and can produce in the first period of existence.
2.3.3 Final Goods Producer and Pricing
Additionally, revenue is not solely determined by production, but also prices.
Prices differ since goods are differentiated. I use a monopolistic competition frame-






Where yi is the individual i’s physical output. A final goods producer operates
this aggregator technology and sells the final output Y, which is the numeraire.
Payments to producers are made in the numeraire good as well. Thus, the following















To tractably represent the impact of a housing crisis on the banking sector, I
implement a financial sector consisting of one-period banks in my framework. These
banks are born at the end of the period when households and businesses are making
savings/intertemporal borrowing decisions, which they facilitate by taking deposits
and making intertemporal loans. They anticipate intratemporal lending in the next
period (since there is no aggregate risk) and hold enough deposits overnight to meet
the demand for working capital loans. After intratemporal loans are made and
production takes place in the subsequent period, loans are repaid, depositors receive
payments, and the bank consumes a fraction of profits before exiting.
However, their ability to lend is subject to an incentive constraint that requires
some equity or “skin in the game” from the bank. That is, the bank is limited in
its ability to leverage its initial wealth, which I assume is strictly positive. I model
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this as a simple leverage constraint, where lending capacity depends on the bank’s
initial net worth and the interest rate. This constraint generates a positive spread
between the interest rate faced by borrowers and the deposit rate. As the constraint
tightens, there is potential for the interest rate to rise.
I assume banks are endowed with a fixed amount of housing, as well as trans-
fers from profits of exiting banks. This assumption represents a world where bank
net worth is inherently tied to housing markets, which is in line with the substantial
exposure of local banks to housing markets seen in pre-crisis characteristics of bank
balance sheets. Assets on bank balance sheets like mortgages and MBS can dete-
riorate in response to house price shocks, leading to lower net worth and reducing
the capacity of the bank to lend. Since they only live for one period in this simple
model, initial equity is entirely determined by their endowment, which in turn de-
pends on house prices and performance of previous banks. As I will show, this initial
endowment is important for determining credit supplied by the bank. Furthermore,
banks are able to own rental housing, which leads to interactions between credit
supply and their choices over housing assets.
This model is similar in spirit to that of Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2015) in that banks are subject to an internal enforcement constraint.
It differs in that part of their endowment stems from housing, representing exposure
to housing in a static setting which could be the result of endogenous choices in a
dynamic setting. Furthermore, by modeling one period banks, it is not possible for
banks to alleviate the impact of their endowment by accumulating net worth over
time. In that sense, the stark assumptions of this framework allow for changes in
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credit supply in response to changes in housing values in a static setting that mimics
the dynamics of the amplifier effect seen in this literature.14
2.3.4.1 Bank Problem
Banks make choices over a portfolio of assets. They lend to businesses, via
intertemporal loans b and intratemporal loans `, they lend to housing markets via
mortgages m, and they own rental housing hR which yields rental return Rh and
is valued at price qh. Since ` and b both face the same interest rate when b < 0, I
define a as a generic business loan associated with interest rate r` that can either
be intertemporal or intratemporal. The banks have linear preferences in end of life
wealth, discounting it by χ which reflects the fact that some of their profits must
be transferred to new banks. That is, at time t, the bank’s objective is given by:
V = χn (2.22)
This is subject to the constraint that net worth is equal to returns on rental housing
hR, mortgages m, and business loans a net of repayment to depositors:
n = (Rh + q
′
h(1− δH))hR + (1 + rm)φmm+ (1 + r`)a− (1 + rd)d (2.23)
As is standard in the literature, the bank has to fund assets out of deposits and
initial net worth wb
m+ a+ qhhR = d+ wb (2.24)
14In future work, I hope to extend this to a dynamics setting, in which housing choices can be
endogenously determined. Then, subject to a housing shocks, bank net worth will be impacted,
leading to similar dynamics in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015).
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If there is no other constraint, the returns collapse to where there is no spread
between the return on assets and the deposit rate. In this case, profits are zero on
all intermediated funds, and zero in general unless the bank enters with some base
level of net worth wb > 0.
I assume the bank does enter with some wealth, and this endowment is key for
relaxing an enforcement constraint. Conceptually, the bank manager can attempt
to divert all the proceeds from assets and succeed with some probability 1/θ. Due
to limited liability, depositors are by law only able to recoup the initial wealth of
the banker in the case of diversion. To discourage such an attempt, the constraint
requires that initial wealth of the bank is enough to cover the amount the bank
manager can divert for his own purposes. This constraint is given by:
θwb ≥ (1 + rm)m+ (1 + rl)a+ (Rh + q′h(1− δH))hR (2.25)
This ensures that the value of repaying depositors is greater than the expected
residual value of assets gross of interest the bank managers can capture if they decide
to divert the proceeds. When tight, this constraint generates a spread between the
lending rate and the borrowing rate.15






= (1 + rm)φm = (1 + r`) (2.26)
I use this relationship to simplify the exposition of the bank problem.
15Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) argue that one real world example of such an action by bank
managers is that executives can pay themselves large bonuses in the absence of countervailing
incentives which inhibit the intermediation process.
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2.3.4.2 Timing, Endowments, and Aggregation
Since borrowing and lending in interperiod loans and deposit markets occurs
at the end of the period, as dictated by the entrepreneurial sector problem, I assume
the following timing. New banks are born at the end of the period and overlap briefly
with old banks. Old banks receive payments and returns from assets, sell housing,
and transfer wealth to new banks, while new banks receive their endowment, take
deposits, buy/sell housing, lend to consumers and firms, and reserve some funds
for intraperiod loans in the next period. I assume this happens frictionlessly, with
transfers and purchases happening simultaneously. A clearinghouse construct could
be used to obtain this, or a contractual framework in which transfers and obligations
net out once banks, households, and firms have made decisions.
The determination of initial net worth wb is important for the exposure of the
banking sector to changes in housing. I assume it is a function of housing and a
fraction 1 − χ of previous aggregate bank net worth N (which is why net worth
is discounted by χ in the value function: they only receive χ units). The housing
endowment for the bank is a real share δh of the housing stock H+HR. That is, they
are endowed with the replacement stock of housing, independent of the valuation of
housing. This stock is valued at qh, so as qh varies, so will initial net worth:
wb = (1− χ)N + qhδh(H +HR) (2.27)
From this expression, it is apparent that as house prices fluctuate, and end-of-period
aggregate net worth fluctuates, initial net worth will change. It is clear that housing
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preferences will influence this expression through the housing endowment, but the
fluctuation in aggregate net worth involves bank choices, and furthermore bank
profitability will influence initial worth through transfers. Note that because there
are measure 1 banks, each bank gets a share proportional to aggregate net worth of





Aggregation of end-of-period profits across banks leads to a net worth accu-
mulation equation of:
N = ((Rh + q
′
h(1− δH))HR + (1 + rm)φM + (1 + r`)A− (1 + r)D) (2.28)
I can plug in the incentive constraint and the generalized return on bank assets to
arrive at the following expression for net worth accumulation:
N = (RbφWb − (1 + r)(φ− 1)Wb) (2.29)
Where φ is the leverage ratio. This equation makes clear that net worth at the end of
the period is dependent on initial wealth Wb. Initial wealth is in turn dependent on
end-of-period net worth from exiting banks. This recursion creates an amplification
effect as bank profitability leads to lower net worth, which impairs the ability of
the bank to lend by tightening the constraint. Plugging in the definition for the
endowment and simplifying, I arrive at the following equation for end-of-period
bank net worth:
N =
qhδh(H +HR) ((Rb − (1 + r))φ+ (1 + r))
1− (1− χ) ((Rb − (1 + r))φ+ (1 + r))
(2.30)
This equation shows that net worth is a positive function of house prices. Further-
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more, there is the potential for an amplification effect, as the term in the denomina-
tor is less than one. The ultimate change in end-of-period net worth, then, depends
on the return on assets Rb and leverage φ.
Since N is dependent on Wb, returns to assets, and the volume of assets and
deposits, it is difficult to determine what happens given a shock to house prices.
Certainly Wb falls due to lower values of housing endowments, which could generate
lower N , which in turn leads to lower Wb, and so on. This in turn tightens the
constraint. However, this implies that leverage must fall and bank profits fall as
well, which is an equilibrium outcome. In general, I find that interest rates must rise
and bank leverage decline in response to a house price shock, leading to lower levels
of lending under higher borrowing costs. Since depositors respond fairly elastically
to a change in the interest rate (through reduced salaries), leverage falls, which is
consistent with an increase in the interest rate.
2.3.5 Equilibrium
Define firm labor demand functions as h(zi, ki, bi) and bond demand func-
tions b(zi, ki, bi) that maximize the firm’s problem, given the pricing equation in
the previous section. Let ι(zi, ki, bi) be an indicator function that is equal to one if
b(zi, ki, bi) > 0, and 0 otherwise. Also, let N denote bank net worth in steady state,
L denote labor supply and Ld denote total labor demand, and all other aggregate
objects are defined as in previous sections. A stationary recursive competitive equi-
librium in this economy, then, is a set of prices {w, {pi}∀i, rm, r`, q, qb, qh, Rh} that
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clears the markets listed below.
Housing:
Ho +Hr = 1 (2.31)
Mortgage:
M = qh(H − (1− δh)H) (2.32)
Labor:
L = Ld =
∫
i
h(zi, ki, bi) di (2.33)
Bonds and Working Capital:∫
i
(1 + r`)wh(zi, ki, bi) di−
∫
i




b(zi, ki, bi)ι(zi, ki, bi) di+OBD
Here, I posit there are outside investors that inelastically demand bonds OBD,
which I calibrate in my quantitative section to foreign share of public debt. This
dampens the response of savings to the interest rate, which moves quite elastically
in steady state.
Aggregate initial net worth of the banking sector Wb follows the law of motion:





q(b)(1− ι(zi, ki, bi))b(zi, ki, bi) di+
∫
i
wh(zi, ki, bi) di.
Define µ(z, k, b) as the distribution of firms across idiosyncratic productivities,






µ(z, k, b)dbdkdz = 1 (2.36)
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This object follows a law of motion Γ that is dependent on the exogenous processes
specified in previous sections and optimal decisions of agents in the economy:
µ′(z, k, b) = Γ(µ(z, k, b)) (2.37)
In a stationary distribution, µ(z, k, b) = Γ(µ(z, k, b)). Given a distribution µ, the






kµ(z, k, b) db dk dz = K (2.38)






zρkραh(z, k, b)ρ(1−α)µ(z, k, b) db dk dz = Y (2.39)







In my calibration, I consider the set of moments described in Table 2.4. The
first group of parameters I either take from the literature or I match moments by
construction given data from the source listed.
The persistence of firm productivity ϕ is chosen from a range of estimates in
the literature. There is substantial debate as to the best choice, so I pick a value that
is central to potential estimates in Asker et al. (2014).16 Likewise with depreciation
δ, markups ρ, housing depreciation δh, and the discount factor β, I pick relatively
standard values in the literature.
16The evidence from Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Moll (2014) suggests that self-financing can
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Calibration: Selected Parameters
Parameter Value Target Criteria/Source
ρ 0.9091 10 % Markups: Basu and Fernald (1997)
β 0.9615 4% deposit rate
ζ 0.9 10% death rate
ϕ 0.8 Asker et al. (2014)





= 1/3 Robb and Robinson (2012)
Table 2.4: Targets for Calibration. Note: Data sourced from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (FF), and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) are denoted as such. FDIC targets are based on my tabulations
from state bank data.
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I choose ξh to reflect the finding in Robb and Robinson (2012) that personal
loans or home equity lines of credit were used for roughly a third of external finance in
their sample. Thus, I pick a collateral value that is one half of the value for business
capital. This perhaps reflects the relative ease with which banks can collect business
assets vs. personal assets in case of default. Note that this value is dependent on
the results in Table 2.5.
The 10 parameters in Table 2.5 are chosen jointly, targeting the moment listed
from the literature. My model fits housing and debt-to-GDP data well. Given other
values, bank leverage and house price-to-rent ratios can be matched almost exactly.
Note that the latter is the mean of a range of values given in Garner and Verbrugge
(2009) for pre-crisis housing markets in metropolitan areas. In the model, I target
the standard deviation of investment using the average of t and t − 1 capital in
the denominator. This mitigates the large variation produced by young firms.17 I
miss a little on the share of salaries to GDP, but this is with a fairly large value of
α = 0.37. I pick the value of νl to target employment to population in the data.
Finally, the financial variables are chosen to support a leverage ratio of 12,
which is within a reasonable range cited by the literature (e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015) and Gertler and Karadi (2011)) , and a spread of 133 basis points implied
by the rent-to-price ratio, which is also in a reasonable range given by the literature
at least partially undo the effect of financial frictions in the long-run, at least under higher levels
of persistence. However, Moll (2014) finds that transitions can still be slow even under persistent
processes. Still, in future work I plan to perform some sensitivity analysis at values of, say, 0.7
and 0.95, to match the 10th and 90th percentile in Asker et al. (2014).
17Similar results can be found if entrants are excluded from the standard deviation calculation.
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Calibration: Jointly Determined Parameters
Param. Value Target Data Model Source
α 0.37 Labor Share 0.438 0.463 BEA
νl 2.4 EPOP (BLS) 0.670 0.694 BLS
σ 0.06 S.D. of (i/k) 0.337 0.347 Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006)





νh 1.25 Housing/GDP 1.80 1.76 FF
ε 0.860 qh/Rh 12 12 Garner and
Verbrugge (2009)
θ 12.6 Bank Lev. φ 12 12 Gertler and
Karadi (2011)
χ 0.52 spread implied 133 bp 133 bp
by qh/Rh
OBD 0.413 Foreign-held debt 25% 25% US Treasury
Table 2.5: Targets for Calibration. Note: Data sourced from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (FF), and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) are denoted as such. FDIC targets are based on my tabulations
from state bank data.
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(Phillipon (2015)). Given a target leverage ratio, I can calculate the θ that gives
this at the individual level. Given the overall demand for loans, I can then calculate
the wb necessary for markets to clear.
2.5 Initial Steady State and Crisis
I now turn to comparative statics analysis that explores the response of the
calibrated economy described above to a housing collapse. Specifically, I focus on
a change in demand for owner-occupied housing ε. This allows for both a decline
in house prices qh and a fall in the price-to-rent ratio. Given a shock to ε, a fall in
owner-occupied demand (and relative increase in rental demand) leads to a move
from owner-occupied housing to rental housing. However, as the house price falls,
the bank balance sheet tightens, leading to higher interest rates and a higher rent-
to-price ratio, mitigating the decline in owner-occupied housing somewhat. In what
follows, I choose a shift in ε that generates a house price decline of 22%, which is
higher than the Great Recession average in the US according to FHFA. However,
the national Case-Shiller index indicates a decline of 27% over the 2006-2012 period.
My house price decline splits the difference. Additionally, I find that the decline in
the owner occupied housing share in the model (from 0.67 to 0.57) is larger than
the fall in the data (from roughly 0.68 to 0.64).18
Table 2.6 presents the new steady state results, with column 1 representing the
initial regime and column 2 representing the new regime. The lower housing price
18Other shocks, such as a shock to νh, housing supply and construction, or “outside” demand
could have similar results. I plan to investigate alternative shocks in future iterations of the paper.
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Alternate Regimes
Baseline Housing Crisis Bank Channel Coll. Channel
Only Only
ε 0.860 0.590 0.590 0.590
Output 0.893 0.856 0.875 0.880
Employment 0.695 0.686 0.693 0.693
Capital 1.35 1.23 1.26 1.31
TFP 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00
Debt 0.981 0.788 0.921 0.856
Owner-Occupied 0.670 0.559 0.565 0.547
Housing
qh/qh,baseline 1 0.78 0.76 0.85
qh/Rh 12 10.37 9.59 12
r` 5.33% 6.64% 7.42% 5.33%
w 0.596 0.574 0.565 0.583
φ 12 11.85 11.77 11.97
Bank Net Worth 0.150 0.131 0.126 0.150
Table 2.6: Alternate Regimes
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generates an additional spread over the savings rate of 130 basis points–a substantial
increase in borrowing costs for firms. This is also reflected in a decline in the price-
to-rent ratio from 12 to 10.4. As mentioned above, there is a substantial decline
in owner-occupied housing in line with the decline seen in the Great Recession.
Business debt falls by over 20 percent, while employment falls by 1.2 percent. Capital
stocks fall by 8.9 percent and output declines by about 4.1 percent. The reason
for the disproportionate impact on capital appears to be induced by a drop in
wages, which fall by 3.7 percent and mitigate the effect of rising interest rates on
employment. TFP remains nearly unchanged. However, as we will see, lower capital
stocks will imply lower output per worker.
It is worth noting what this crisis does not represent. Much of the literature
has focused on shocks to collateral constraints ξ or an exogenous shock to financial
intermediaries similar to a change in θ. In these experiments, I do not shock the
financial parameters governing the model. Furthermore, there is no shock to aggre-
gate TFP, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). A simple preference change creates an
endogenous tightening on firm borrowing constraints and a shift in bank credit sup-
ply through falling house prices, without any shock to the real productive capacity
of the economy. The tightening in both credit constraints and credit supply results
from an endogenous response to household preferences and the resulting house price
decline. To be sure, something along the lines of a shock to intermediation parame-
ters, or to TFP, is likely in the context of the Great Recession. This paper, however,
shows the potential for endogenous financial tightening to contribute to the decline
in aggregate outcomes.
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Figure 2.10: Comparison of High and Low House Price Regimes: Age Profile of
Firms
How does this shock impact businesses at various points in their life-cycle? In
figure 2.9, I plot the ratio of each series under the housing crisis regime to its value
under the initial regime. One can think of this as the relative performance of firms
under the crisis regime to their counterparts under the baseline regime. In general, I
find businesses have lower output, capital, and labor inputs than their counterparts
in the baseline, although eventually these values are higher for very old firms. Young
firms are particularly impacted by the new regime, at points experiencing a decline
of over 20 percent relative to the pre-crisis regime. This decline is reflected across
output, employment, and capital. The change in output per worker is volatile in the
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first few periods, as tighter constraints put upward pressure on output per worker
with the decline in employment, but lower capital puts downward pressure on labor
productivity. Eventually, lower capital accumulation over the life cycle of the firm
begins to dominate and push down output per worker as labor recovers more quickly
than capital.
2.6 Counterfactuals and Experiments
To tease out the relative importance of each channel, I undertake two sets of
exercises. First, in order to assess the aggregate impact of each channel, I consider
counterfactuals where one of the mechanisms is removed from the model. I pick
parameters such that the initial steady state is identical to the baseline and then
shock the economy with the same decline in ε. I then evaluate the aggregate impact
of the shock in the new setting. Second, I undertake partial equilibrium analysis to
help decompose the impact of the crisis into a bank channel and a collateral channel,
holding general equilibrium effects constant. The first set of exercises gives a clearer
picture of the aggregate impact of the mechanisms at play in the model, while the
second set more clearly demonstrates the relative importance of each channel for
firms across the age distribution.
2.6.1 Counterfactual Economies
In this set of exercises, I consider two counterfactual economies. In the first, I
shut down the collateral channel by replacing the additional collateral from housing
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ξh(1 − δh)qhHo with a constant ξ̄h equal to the initial value of housing collateral
in the baseline. That is, ξ̄h = ξh(1 − δh)qh,baselineHo,baseline. This is a world where
collateral constraints are the same as in the baseline, but do not tighten due to
declining housing values as they do in the crisis regime. As a result, I denote this
regime by “Bank Channel Only” in Table 2.6.
The second regime is one in which the spread between lending rates and deposit
rates is constant, and bank net worth is a constant. Such an economy could be
constructed by assuming an intermediation cost in the banker’s problem to generate
a spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate, and assuming that the
incentive constraint is not binding either before or after the shock. The only profit
would be generated by loans made from bank net worth, which carry the same
interest rate as loans made from deposits. The lack of a binding constraint means
that lending rates are equal to deposit rates plus the intermediation cost. In this
case, housing collateral can deteriorate as house prices fall, but interest rates do not
fluctuate. This is called the “Collateral Channel Only” regime.
The results for these economies are given in the third and fourth columns of
Table 2.6. Given the same shock to ε, both regimes produce declines in employment
that are muted in comparison to the crisis regime. Capital falls substantially in both
regimes, but particularly in the regime with only the bank channel. The result is a
large decline in output in both regimes, with the bank channel only regime giving
a slightly larger drop in output. For the bank channel regime, this is reflective of
higher labor and capital costs coming through an interest rate that is similar to
that in the crisis regime. However, for the collateral channel regime, labor costs
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fall. Still, labor demand is more constrained by the collateral constraint, as well
as capital investment. The effect of the tighter constraint in this regime prevents
firms from accumulating capital early in their life cycle, and it takes many periods
for them to acquire capital equivalent to the baseline. Furthermore, owner-occupied
housing declines by more in the collateral channel regime. This leads to a tighter
constraint than is apparent from the smaller drop in house prices.
Debt falls by more in the collateral channel regime, although interest rates rise
by more in the bank channel regime as in the original crisis regime. Aggregate TFP
is surprisingly invariant to these shocks, and if anything rises slightly in the bank
channel regime. This suggests small misallocation effects in steady state in response
to the shocks considered in this paper.
It is important, in this model, that these two channels interact to produce the
results in the crisis regime, as neither regime can match the aggregate declines in
output, employment, or capital. This is in part due to the effect the bank channel
has on mortgage rates that in turn creates a larger decline in housing values, as can
be seen by the relatively large decline in housing values in the bank only regime (a
decline of 24%) compared to the decline in the collateral only regime (15%). As bank
balance sheets tighten, mortgage rates rise along with business rates. This leads to
even lower house prices which reinforces the original drop in home values. Thus,
this counterfactual reveals an additional important channel for banks to amplify
the housing crisis through their impact on mortgage rates. This interacts with the
collateral constraint by tightening it further, hitting young businesses even harder.
Without the collateral channel, as in the regime with only the bank channel, aggre-
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gate responses are milder than in the crisis regime because early life cycle capital
accumulation is not affected in the same way. Thus, both channels serve to produce
the aggregate outcomes in the crisis regime, but the amplification channel generated
by the banking sector is key in obtaining these results.19
2.6.2 Partial Equilibrium Experiments
As discussed, shutting down a channel before computing the economy’s reac-
tion to a shock to ε importantly takes into account the general equilibrium effects
of such a change. However, to examine how important the channel is for different
firms across the age distribution in the crisis regime, one might want to consider
partial equilibrium counterfactuals that take as given the general equilibrium effects.
For example, it might be desirable to observe a counterfactual where house prices
decline as in the crisis regime despite a lack of a bank channel. This would illustrate
the impact of the observed house price decline in the crisis regime on firms through
the collateral channel.20
19Note that house prices fall by even more in the bank channel only regime. This is possible
because there is no decline in collateral values. A decline in collateral values leads to a shift inward
in credit demand, which puts downward pressure on interest rates. Without this shift, interest
rates rise by even more than in the original crisis regime. This in turn puts further downward
pressure on house prices through the mortgage rate.
20Holding general equilibrium effects constant will primarily require that I hold the wage constant
at the baseline level. The three main objects determined in general equilibrium that are important
for firm decisions are wages, interest rates, and housing collateral (house prices + owner-occupied
housing stock). The experiments below generally involve allowing the latter two objects to move
independently. As a result, wages will be artificially high and the series will be more severely
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Figure 2.11: Decomposition of Channels: Age Profile of Firms
I consider two exercises. The first, denoted “IR Shock”, is to consider the
impact of an interest rate shock absent a housing collateral shock and general equi-
librium effects observed in the crisis period. In this exercise, the interest rate is held
constant at the level in the crisis (6.64%), but housing collateral is held constant at
the baseline level. I then compute decision rules and the stationary distribution of
firms given wages (set to the baseline level), interest rates, and housing collateral.
This gives me the impact of interest rates on the firm distribution absent a collateral
shock and general equilibrium effects. The second exercise is similar, in that I fix
wages at the baseline level. However, in this exercise I assume house prices and
impacted than in the actual crisis regimes.
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owner-occupied housing fall to their crisis level and interest rates remain at their
pre-crisis level (5.33%). This exercise (the “Collateral Shock” regime) shows the
impact of collateral values on the firm distribution absent an interest rate shock and
general equilibrium effects.
For this exercise, it is more interesting to study the impact of the shock to
the age cross-section of the firm distribution. In Figure 2.10, I again plot the crisis
regime relative to the baseline. I then plot the interest rate shock and collateral
shock regimes relative to the baseline as well. From these figures, it is clear that
young firm performance is well-described by the collateral constraint shock, while
the interest rate shock by itself does little to match the performance of young firms.
As time goes on, however, the interest rate plays a larger role, as higher capital and
labor costs lower the optimal scale of firms. This result is similar to the one found
in Decker (2015), which finds that house price shocks can work through a housing
collateral channel to produce a drop in entrepreneurship and entry like that seen in
the Great Recession.
This result is particularly apparent for capital, as the collateral shock regime
is similar to the crisis regime for roughly the first five years. In later periods, the
interest rate drives output, employment, and capital downward when there is not
an offsetting decline in wages. I interpret this result as consistent with the empirical
results that collateral values are primary for young firms, but the bank channel
explains little of the disproportionate impact of house prices on young firms. On
the other hand, both collateral constraints and the bank channel matter for older
firms, which is consistent with the data.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the impact of house prices on firm growth
in the Great Recession. In particular, it highlights the role of a local bank channel
in amplifying the house price shock. I find the effects working through the bank
balance sheet channel are insignificant for young firms, although the total effect of
house prices on young firms is large. On the other hand, I find the bank balance
sheet mechanism is a significant and important channel for house prices to impact
old and small firms. Old and large firms do not appear to be impacted by local
house price shocks.
I then construct a model with heterogeneous producers where both banks and
entrepreneurs are exposed to house prices. Bank exposure to housing via their en-
dowment generates a contraction in credit supply in response to a collapse in house
prices, which implies an increase in borrowing costs faced by firms. Furthermore,
entrepreneurs are directly impacted by a deterioration in house prices through col-
lateral values, since they are able to borrow against owner-occupied housing. In the
model, young firms are particularly impacted by the housing collapse, just as in the
data. I find that the collateral channel contributes greatly to this effect, as young
firms are more reliant on collateral. However, older firms are more sensitive to the
interest rate shock generated from the banking sector response to the house price
decline. Furthermore, aggregate effects are greatly influenced by the banking chan-
nel, although the role of housing collateral is still significant. The banking sector not
only directly impacts firms, but it amplifies the house price decline by driving up
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interest rates on mortgages. All of this is accomplished without shocks to financial
parameters or productivity, but by endogenous tightening in response to declines in
housing values.
These results suggest that housing market conditions matter for both young
and old/small firms, but the channels through which these firm types are affected
differ. Quantitatively, the impact of the bank channel matters greatly for aggregate
output in the immediate wake of a recession both through its direct effect on busi-
nesses and its amplification of the decline in house prices. The impact on young
firms through the decline in collateral values is important because it reduces output
and capital accumulation in the early stages of the business. In future work, I plan
to investigate the implications of the disproportionate impact on young businesses
for the recovery from a recession induced by a collapse in housing values.
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Chapter 3: Financial Markets, Productivity Dispersion, and Misal-
location
3.1 Introduction
Did variation in financial conditions faced by businesses matter for micro-level
and aggregate outcomes in the most recent financial crisis? This paper analyzes the
potential for utilizing patterns in labor productivity, and in particular dispersion in
labor productivity, to infer the importance of variation in financial conditions. Fur-
thermore, I explore the distinction between the impact of heterogeneous financial
shocks on dispersion across geographies and within geographies. For example, a fi-
nancial shock that falls unevenly across locations could cause misallocation between
firms across those locations, but it could also cause misallocation within each loca-
tion, amplifying or mitigating the impact on dispersion across geographies. I build
on the framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) by incorporating a standard financial
friction and owned capital, I decompose dispersion (and therefore inferred misalloca-
tion) into within and between components. I then further show the within-location
contribution can be decomposed into terms related to the behavior of constrained
and unconstrained firms.
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The paper is motivated by apparent differences in financial conditions faced
by firms. Specifically, I focus on geographic access to banks and banking relation-
ships. That geography is an important determinant in credit conditions faced by the
firms is suggested by the close proximity of most small businesses to their lenders
(see Peterson and Rajan (2002) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), e.g.). Likewise,
the potential for lending relationships overcoming agency problems to ease credit
conditions has been established (see Boot and Thakor (1994), e.g.). More recently,
empirical work such as Greenstone et al. (2014) and Chodorow-Reich (2014) has
explored the impact of geographic segmentation and financial relationships, respec-
tively, finding impacts of lender health on credit conditions.
In the previous chapter, I showed the relevance of local banking conditions,
characterized by FDIC call report data on bank balance sheets, to identify the states
that are more precariously positioned prior to the onset of the Great Recession. I
argued this identifies a credit supply effect that potentially amplifies an unexpected
decline in housing prices. However, my empirical work was silent as to the exact
nature of the financial shock, which could be either an interest rate shock (as in
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)), a collateral shock (as in Khan and Thomas (2013)),
or some other type of financial shock. This paper takes seriously the implications
of geographic segmentation by exploring the implications of an islands model. Ad-
ditionally, I discuss the effects of several shocks considered in the literature, noting
how they differ in terms of implications for productivity measures.
I focus on both employment and measures of labor productivity, and I further I
distinguish between effects of heterogeneous shocks on outcomes across geographies
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as opposed to those within geographies. I first show that heterogeneous shocks to
financial conditions can lead to increased dispersion of outcomes across geographies,
while the reaction of dispersion within a locality to a financial shock depends on
the type of shock. Interest rate shocks can potentially decrease dispersion in both
productivity and employment growth rates, while collateral shocks increase disper-
sion. These changes in dispersion, in this framework, are indicative of changes in
misallocation, as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). This implies that the nature of fi-
nancial shock (i.e. whether it impacts the price or extension of credit) is crucial for
determining the allocative effect of a crisis.
Key to my analysis is a variance decomposition of labor productivity disper-
sion into within-geography and between-geography impacts. I undertake some sim-
ple comparative statics to illustrate first-order impacts of various financial shocks,
abstracting from long-run distributional impacts. I show that between-geography
dispersion can easily summarized as a function of the difference in geography means
to the overall mean. I then show that within-geography labor productivity dispersion
has multiple components, but crucially relies on the dispersion of constrained firms.
In these exercises, I show that interest rate shocks and collateral constraint shocks
have qualitatively different effects on within-isand labor productivity dispersion.
I then construct a general equilibrium version of the model with two key fea-
tures of financial markets: geographic segmentation with heterogeneous financial
intermediation costs and collateral constraints that depend on the age of a firm’s
current relationship with a bank. These features allow me to investigate the role
of various financial shocks, both across and within localities. Utilizing the variance
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decomposition I derived, my results show little role for between-island dispersion
relative to within-island dispersion. However, I consider scenarios in which between
island dispersion plays a larger role. Furthermore, I discuss the impact of each shock
on within-island dispersion and overall dispersion. I find that short run effects are
in line with my simple analytics, but long-run distribution changes may mute the
effects of the initial impact.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper relates closely with the recent literature investigating the impor-
tance of heterogeneity in financial conditions faced by firms. While notions of geo-
graphic segmentation in financial markets had been incorporated into macro models
(see Williamson (1989) and Morgan et al. (2004), e.g.) and the finance literature
had investigated the role of relationships in determining firm outcomes (see Peterson
and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), e.g.), the onset of the financial crisis
in 2008 and subsequent recession has led to a renewed interest in these aspects in the
macro-finance literature. Chodorow-Reich (2014) uses syndicated loan data to doc-
ument the importance of pre-crisis financial relationships in determining outcomes,
suggesting as much as one third of the drop in employment can be linked to rela-
tionship frictions.1 Boualam (2015) likewise presents a search and matching model
where the deterioration in relationship frictions can be important for determining
aggregate outcomes.
1Additionally, the DSGE model employed in the appendix of the paper is a simple islands
model, similar in spirit to the model I consider here.
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Recent empirical papers have begun to explore the importance of geographic
segmentation of financial markets over the past few decades in the US. Greenstone et
al. (2014) use loan origination data for large banks to develop a “Bartik” style credit
supply shock based on variation in county footprints of these banks. They downplay
the importance of such shocks over the recession, suggesting limited impacts on real
variables. Davis and Haltiwanger (2017) consider both house prices’ and similar
large bank credit supply shocks’ effect on young business outcomes. While they
find significant effects of a similar Bartik shock, they emphasize a larger effect of
house prices on local market outcomes, in particular in the Great Recession. My
previous chapter contributes to this literature by exploring the role of the local
banking sector, finding substantial impacts of the interaction between local house
prices and local bank balance sheets.
Within the broad theoretical literature on financial frictions, my paper also
sits within a growing literature of models of financial frictions with heterogeneous
firms. Recent papers that investigate a “credit crunch” include Khan and Thomas
(2013), Midrigan and Xu (2014), and Buera and Moll (2015). My paper is most
similar to Khan and Thomas in that I consider a discrete time setup with decreasing
returns to scale (in revenue production). I also allow for investment decisions to be
made prior to the realization of next period shocks. However, I do not consider
aggregate risk in my model, and the model is entrepreneurial in that each firm
is owned by a single proprietor. Additionally, recent work has considered various
credit supply shocks that generate higher cost of borrowing (see Gertler and Karadi
(2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)). I utilize simple interest rate spread shocks
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in this model, similar to Ajello (2016). Additionally, the assumption of a isoelastic
demand and constant returns to scale, and the implications these assumptions have
for misallocation, follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
My analysis shares many symmetries with Gopinath et al. (2016), who also
utilize a framework similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), using the setup to explore
the allocative implications of interest rates in the context of European financial
liberalization. Likewise, I investigate the role of different financial shocks and their
impact on aggregate and distributional outcomes, and use the data to suggest which
shocks best fit. I focus on both short run and long-run outcomes in my framework,
but my ultimate goal is to draw implications about labor productivity over the busi-
ness cycle in the context of the United States. Their focus is to explain long run
trends in marginal revenue products of capital in the context of European financial
market integration. Still, their point that lower interest rates can increase misallo-
cation is a mirror image to one of the interest rate shocks I consider, and the inverse
relationship between interest rates and misallocation is a common thread between
these papers.
To provide an accounting framework that will illustrate the variation in out-
comes based on the type of shock, I write down a simple model (consisting primarily
of the firm’s problem in my general equilibrium framework) to fix ideas about what
to expect in the next section.
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3.3 Producer framework and Analytics
In this section, I use the static firm’s problem from a model similar to Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) as an accounting framework for describing the effect of various
credit supply shocks. This problem will be incorporated into a general equilibrium
framework later in the paper, but I want to focus on the static portion of the
problem here to fix ideas about how employment and labor productivity at the firm
level should respond to various shocks. Importantly, this model will abstract from
various sources of dispersion and variation in labor productivity. Frictions and/or
distortions, adjustment costs, overhead labor, dispersion in factor prices, and non-
CES demand structure could result in variation in productivity and productivity
growth across firms. However, the model presented here is a simplified view through
which I can investigate the partial equilibrium impact of various shocks on the
change in productivity, as well as labor.
Consider a final good produced by a simple CES aggregator. Intermediate
goods are produced by a continuum of firms with constant returns in physical inputs.
Each intermediate firm enters into the period with capital holdings k. Focusing on
the static problem, the primary friction is that the firm must pay labor up front
using a working capital constraint (1 + rn)wh ≤ ξ(a)(1 − δ)k. That is, firms can
borrow up to some fraction ξn of their capital k (depreciated by δ) to pay workers
at wages w for hours h. The fraction ξn is a function of relationship age a, and rn
is the lending rate on island n. The resulting static profit maximization problem





Y 1−ρzρkραhρ(1−α) − (1 + rn)wh (3.1)
s.t.
(1 + rn)wh ≤ ξn(a)(1− δ)k (3.2)
3.3.1 Labor Outcomes







From this one can see changes in employment depend on a variety of factors, includ-
ing general demand effects (Y ), wages (w), productivity (Z), and capital holdings
(k). Importantly, the optimal allocation also depends on the interest rate, which is
the result of the working capital friction. One source of differences in employment
outcomes across locations n could be differences in financial conditions, even for
unconstrained firms.





In addition to the effect of interest rates that is similar to the effect for unconstrained
firms, it is clear that a negative shock to collateral constraints ξn(a) negatively
impacts employment. Since ξ varies with relationship age, banking relationships are
important in determining labor outcomes for the firm. Furthermore, capital holdings
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are also important, and in general firms will be able to “outgrow” their collateral
constraints by accumulating capital. Importantly, productivity and demand do not
enter into the equation above, since the constraint, when tight, is an arbitrary
impediment to accumulating labor, and therefore inefficient.
Note the point where hopt = hcon defines the boundary between constrained
and unconstrained firms:
k∗(z, ξn(a), rn, w, Y ) = (3.5)((
ρ(1− α)Y 1−ρzρ
) 1








3.3.2 Labor Productivity outcomes
Rearranging equation 3 above, I can characterize labor productivity in terms








Labor productivity is constant across unconstrained firms in location n, and the
only difference across islands among unconstrained firms results from the difference
in interest rate rn. This stark result is partly derived from the CES structure of
demand combined with Cobb-Douglas production. In reality, variation in factor
prices (w) or non-isoelastic demand could lead to dispersion in productivity without
financial constraints. Given that the nature of the theoretical experiments I run are
financial, I focus on this type of production and demand structure to highlight the
potential effect of financial conditions.
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For constrained firms, I can simply plug equation 4 into the production func-









Again, productivity is tied to financial conditions through the interest rate and
the collateral constraint. Productivity will vary idiosyncratically across constrained
firms, and labor productivity is now a function of TFP z, total output Y , and
firm capital k. Thus, all dispersion in labor productivity is driven by differences in
interest rates across locations and the effects of the collateral constraint, since OPL
would be constant across firms if all locations faced the same interest rate and did
not face collateral constraints.
3.3.3 Partial Equilibrium Effects of Financial Shocks
Consider changes to the primary financial variables in the model: rn, ξn, and
a. That is, there can be a pure credit supply shock, which effects borrowing rates rn
despite no initial change in underlying deposit rates, an “imposed credit demand”
shock when the collateral constraint tightens, or a deterioration in banking rela-
tionship ages a (which will occur with some probability in the full model). As will
become clear, each of these shocks will imply similar effects in terms of employment,
but different effects in terms of labor productivity.
Consider interest rate and collateral constraint shocks to ln(h) and ln(OPL),
which translate to percentage changes in hours and OPL. For unconstrained firms,
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That is for both constrained and unconstrained producers, one would expect hours












Thus hours for constrained firms only increase with a loosening of the collateral
























Thus, ln(OPL) rises with an increase in interest rates, and it also rises with
a decline in collateral requirements, but only for constrained firms.
From a macro perspective, if a large financial shock hits an economy, and
its impact is heterogeneous across islands, then there is the potential to generate
larger amplification of the shock as productivity can become more dispersed. Thus,
allowing a shock such as the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 to differentially affect
various localities could help explain some of the amplification of the initial impulse
and the depth of the resulting recession. In the next section, I will discuss the
implications for dispersion more explicitly.
3.4 Financial Shocks and Productivity Dispersion
Given the above characterization of firm choices, and assuming the economy
is in an equilibrium in which the constraint occasionally binds (that is some firms
are constrained while others are unconstrained), I will now construct a measure of
variance in labor productivity in the economy (σLOPL) that is a function of mea-
sures of dispersion in log labor productivity within islands (σnLOPL) and measures of
dispersion across islands. As will become clear, heterogeneous financial shocks have
the potential to create dispersion across islands. However is not as clear whether
they create more within island dispersion. That is, the impact of financial shocks
on dispersion and misallocation of inputs depends on the type of financial shocks.2
2Khan and Thomas (2013) find that financial shocks embodied in a “credit crunch”, or tight-
ening collateral constraint, increase misallocation. However, Gopinath et al. (2015) note that a
decline in interest rates, a type of relaxation in financial conditions, can lead to increased misallo-
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Defining mn as the mass of firms on island n (assumed to be fixed), LOPLn as
the average log labor productivity dispersion on island n, and LOPL as the over-
all average log labor productivity dispersion, it is apparent that total dispersion
is composed of two terms. First is the weighted average of log labor productivity
dispersion on each island. In other words, this is the contribution of “within-island
dispersion” to overall productivity dispersion. Second, there is the weighted sum of
squared differences between mean labor productivity on each island and the overall
mean log labor productivity. This represents the contribution of cross-island av-
erage differences to total dispersion, which I call “between-island dispersion.” The
remainder of this section will focus on each of the two components in turn.
First, I show that the direction of the impact of a financial shock on pro-
ductivity dispersion within islands can be decomposed into the effect on disper-
sion of constrained firms (σnLOPL,con), the relative mean of constrained log labor
productivity(LOPLcon,n − LOPLn), the relative mean of unconstrained log labor
productivity and (LOPLopt,n − LOPLn)), and the measure of constrained firms
(µn). I will show that each of these effects increase within island dispersion in
response to a collateral constraint shock, but decrease within island dispersion in
response to an interest rate shock. I then turn to investigate the impact of interest
cation.
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rate and productivity shocks on “between-island” dispersion, showing that the effect
of both shocks is to unambiguously increase cross-island dispersion. Finally, I will
address the extensive margin. Here, I reach the limits of these simple analytics.
While I will be able to characterize the initial reaction of productivity dispersion to
financial shocks, the endogenous response of the distribution will imply dynamics
that must be explicitly modeled in a quantitative framework.
3.4.1 Within-Island Dispersion
I first begin by exploring within island dispersion in depth. To begin, I consider


















I will first consider what occurs given a fixed distribution among constrained and
unconstrained firms. I then turn to the extensive margin before summarizing within-
island impacts of financial shocks.
3.4.1.1 Constrained Firm Dispersion
The first term is the contribution of within island dispersion of constrained
firms. Note that there is no dispersion of labor productivity among unconstrained
3Note that since log labor productivity of unconstrained firms ln(OPLopt) = ln(1+rn)+ln(w)−
ln(ρ(1− α)), within island dispersion of unconstrained firms σnopt,n = 0, and so is not included in
this equation.
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firms, so only the mean of unconstrained firms relative to the island mean contributes
to dispersion, which I collect with relative mean of constrained firms to the island








ι(z, k, a) dk da dz (3.18)
where ι(z, k, a) is the mass of firms (z, k, a), and k∗ is as defined in equation (5).4




= ρ2σ2n,z + (1− ρ)2σ2n,k + (1− ρ(1− α))2σ2n,ξ (3.19)
−2ρ(1− ρ)σn,z,k − 2ρ(1− ρ(1− α))σn,z,ξ + 2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− α))σn,k,ξ
Where σ2n,z is the variance of log idiosyncratic productivity on island n, σ
2
n,k
is the variance of log capital on island n, and σ2n,ξ is the variance of ln(ξn(a)).
Additionally, cross terms σn,u,v denote the covariances between variables u and v.
Crucially, note that the interest rate rn does not enter into dispersion of log labor
productivity for constrained firms. This means that the impact of interest rates
on productivity dispersion will solely impact overall dispersion through changes
in relative means, cross-island dispersion, and distributional shifts. On the other
hand, the effect of a tightening in the ξ function on constrained dispersion will
depend on several factors. First, it will depend on whether the tightening is uniform
4Note here that the distribution is assumed to be static, but in reality it will be an endogenous
object that responds to changes in financial conditions. The rest of what follows can be considered
analysis of the impact, or initial period after a shock. A quantitative model is necessary to explore
either the long-run implications or transition paths past the first period after a shock. I explore
such a model in my quantitative section.
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across age groups. If the constraint tightens by the same percentage for each age
(ξ′n(a) ∝ ξn(a)), and if the mass of constrained firms remains constant, there will be
no change in log productivity dispersion among constrained firms. However, if the
shock is not uniform (some relationship ages a are impacted by larger percentage
declines in ξn(a)), or if I account for the fact that new firms will become constrained
due to the tightening, then dispersion among constrained firms will change.
3.4.1.2 Relative Mean Contribution
Since optimal OPL is equalized across firms:
LOPLopt,n = ln(1 + rn) + ln(w) + ln(ρ(1− α)) (3.20)
On the other hand, the mean of constrained firms will depend on the distribution.










ι(z, k, a) [ρln(z)− (1− ρ)ln(k)− (1− ρ(1− α))ln(ξn(a))] dk da dz
]
Finally, there is the term LOPLn = µnLOPLcon,n+(1−µn)LOPLopt,n. Holding the




































This in turn means that the mean of unconstrained firms reacts more to a change
in interest rate than the mean of constrained firms. If interest rates are rising, this
means dLOPLopt,n/drn and dLOPLcon,n/drn (and thus dLOPLn/drn), but since
the relative mean of constrained firms is changing less than unconstrained firms, the
change in LOPLcon,n−LOPLn should be negative, while the change in LOPLopt,n−
LOPLn is positive. Since the relative mean of constrained is above the island mean,
this means the relative mean of unconstrained firms is declining. On the other hand,
the mean of unconstrained firms is rising relative to the island mean, narrowing the
gap since it is less than or equal to the island mean. Both forces serve to reduce
dispersion, absent a change in µn, which I consider in the next section.
In the case of a tightening in collateral constraints, the picture is somewhat





To evaluate the impact on constrained firms, assume the collateral constraint func-
tion takes the form ξn(a) = κnξ(a). If I hold the distribution of constrained firms













Clearly, this implies that the relative mean of constrained firms will react more
to a tightening in the collateral constraint, which means dispersion will rise as
LOPLcon,n−LOPLn rises and LOPLopt,n−LOPLn falls. While the picture is more
complicated if there is not a proportional decline across a, so long as the mean
constraint falls, this result will hold.
3.4.1.3 Extensive Margin: µn
From the simple analytics above, I can evaluate the impact of financial shocks
on the marginally constrained firm (the firm where the constraint is just binding) to
infer the impact on the extensive margin. First, note that the marginally constrained













In order to evaluate how this firm responds to the shock, I utilize the responses



















Since the optimal values is declining by more than the constrained value (from
an initial point where they were equalized), the firm becomes unconstrained (the
constraint is no longer marginally binding).
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However, the response to a collateral constraint shock reverses the order:
∣∣∣∣dln(OPLcon)dξn
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣−1− α2ξn(a)
∣∣∣∣ > 0 = ∣∣∣∣dln(OPLopt)dξn
∣∣∣∣ (3.30)
Here, constrained LOPL adjusts by more than unconstrained LOPL, implying that
the firm now becomes unconstrained.
Extrapolating these movements to the broader set of firms, I argue that a mass
of firms who were previously constrained will become unconstrained in response to
an interest rate shock, while a mass of unconstrained firms will become constrained
in response to a collateral constraint shock.
What does this extensive margin imply for the other components of within-
island dispersion? A further decomposition separating (σnLOPL,con)
2 could be con-
trived, breaking the term into “previously” constrained” and “newly constrained.”
For now, I will note that the result of this decomposition would be ambiguous, and
leave the derivation to future work.
3.4.1.4 Within-Island Summary
Pulling together the discussion above, I now summarize the impacts of an
interest rate shock an a collateral constraint shock. I begin with an interest rate
shock. For each component of within-island dispersion, I note the reaction of each
term to an increase in the interest rate rn. I note by ∗ each case where distributional
aspects will potentially counteract this effect.
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Here, the effect of each component generally work to increase dispersion (ab-
sent distributional changes denoted by ∗), except the increase in the share of un-
constrained firms, making the effect of the last term dependent on the change in
the relative mean of unconstrained firms. However, the total effect of the relative
means (the second and third terms) should work to decrease dispersion even if the
third term contributes more to dispersion on net, at least in the short run.5






















The response of dispersion is the mirror image of the response to interest rate
shocks. Again, there is some abstraction from distributional aspects here, but the
general picture is one of increased dispersion in response to a tightening in collateral
constraints.
5However, as µn goes to 1, the relative means disappear. This implies within island dispersion
is solely driven by constrained dispersion, and distribution changes matter even more, especially
in the long run.
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3.4.2 Cross-Island Dispersion
Given responses of within-island dispersion, I can now evaluate the impact of
shocks on between-island dispersion. This term relies solely on relative means of
each island to the overall mean. As seen before, within-island means are a function
of constrained and unconstrained means. Constrained means are dependent, in part
on the distribution of firms. I consider two cases to evaluate potential impacts of
financial shocks on cross-island dispersion. First, I consider interest rate dispersion
when there are no constrained firms (a case where there are no collateral constraints).
Second, I consider collateral constraint shocks when the constraint binds for all firms.
These illustrative examples help guide expectations for the results of a calibrated
model.
3.4.2.1 Cross-island Dispersion and Interest Rates
Suppose the constraint ξn(a) is not binding for any firm on any island at any
age. Then, I can summarize LOPLn = ln(1 + rn) + ln(w) + ln(ρ(1−α)). Then, the
overall mean of log labor productivity can be written as:
LOPL = ln(w) + ln (ρ(1− α)) +
N∑
n=1
mnln(1 + rn) (3.33)
I can then write the relative mean of island log labor productivity to overall log
labor productivity as the difference between the island log gross interest rates and
average log gross interest rates across islands (r̄):
(LOPLn − LOPL) = ln(1 + rn)−
N∑
i=1
miln(1 + ri) = ln(1 + rn)− r̄ (3.34)
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Re-writing the second term of (16):
N∑
n=1
mn(LOPLn − LOPL) =
N∑
n=1
mn(ln(1 + rn)− r̄)2 (3.35)
Under this set of assumptions, there is no within island dispersion in log labor
productivity. Thus, the above equation defines both dispersion in log gross interest






mn(ln(1 + rn)− r̄)2 (3.36)
3.4.2.2 Cross-Island Dispersion and Collateral Constraints
Noting again that island means are the weighted means of constrained and
unconstrained firms, and that unconstrained firm labor productivity is unaffected
by collateral constraints, I can focus on the mean of constrained firms in response to
a shift in collateral constraints. If one supposes a proportional shift as before, from
(3.27) it is clear the change in log island productivity, so long as the distribution is
fixed, will depend on the extent to which κn changes. If a shock across islands differs
in terms of its impact on κn for each n, then the relative means will be impacted
through the first term in equation (3.27).
However, I will note that this only impact constrained firms, muting the effect
this may have on changes in island mean log labor productivity. On the other hand,
as the distribution changes, this could cause either an increase or decrease in the
mean. Thus, it is difficult to discern the extent of the impact of the shock on overall
dispersion, as it will depend on the dispersion of the shock and the effect on the
distribution.
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To get a better sense of both the impact of shocks on the distribution, which
could counteract some of the effects highlighted here, and in order to quantify the
impacts of financial shocks on dispersion, and the individual components of disper-
sion, I will turn to a quantitative model
3.5 Quantitative Model
I now turn to the full version of the model to explore the predictions from
earlier sections in a general equilibrium setting. In particular, I quantify the con-
tributions of the various components of productivity dispersion discussed above. I
consider the impact on aggregate quantities and total factor productivity in both
the short run and the long run.
The model consists of three types of agents: a representative household, a
continuum of entrepreneurs/producers who are heterogeneous in productivity, port-
folio holdings, banking relationship age, and location, and financial intermediaries
who take deposits from the household and lend to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur
borrowing is impeded by two financial frictions: a collateral requirement (which
varies according to banking relationship age) and geographic financial market seg-
mentation. Entrepreneurs and banks are divided among banking islands. Banks
and entrepreneurs can only engage in lending arrangements if they are located on
the same island.
Additionally, there are limited life cycle dynamics in that entrepreneurs are
born exogenously and are subject to an exogenous death shock, which are standard.
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The household’s problem is also standard, and bank decisions will be fairly straight-
forward. I describe household and entrepreneur problems, then I describe life cycle
dynamics of firms, and finally I discuss the financial intermediary’s problem.
3.5.1 Household Problem
The household maximizes utility over consumption c and leisure l, provides
labor H = 1 − l to producers at wage w, and saves s at deposit rate r in a single
financial market (banks compete in a single deposit market). I will not delve too
deeply into the decisions of the household, as it is standard, but for completeness,







ct + qt+1st+1 = st + wtHt + πt (3.38)
Bank profits πt are potentially positive, but in the simple setup I discuss in this
document, profits will be zero. Importantly, first order conditions imply that in
steady state:
q = β (3.39)





For the purposes of calibration, I will assume U(., .) takes the form:
U(ct, 1−Ht) = log(ct) + φ(1−Ht) (3.41)
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This will allow me to write wage as the product of consumption and the preference
parameter on leisure:
wt = φct (3.42)
3.5.2 Entrepreneurs
I assume a continuum of measure 1 entrepreneurs exist, each producing a
variety i of the intermediate good. Without loss of generality, I assume there are N
discrete islands, and that the continuum of entrepreneurs is divided up among these
islands such that an equal number is on each island.
With the addition of idiosyncratic risk, entrepreneurs maximize over future
expected utility.
Vn(zi, k, b, a) = max
c,`,k′,h
ln(c) + βζE [Vn(z
′
i, k
′, b′, a′)] (3.43)
The producer maximizes over consumption, labor, loans, and future capital subject
to the following budget constraint:
c+ k′ + q(b′)b′ = pizik
αh1−α + (1− δ)k + b− (1 + rn)` (3.44)
Where the first term on the right hand size is a Cobb-Douglas production function
with constant returns multiplied by a product specific price. Capital evolves in
the typical fashion: k′ = (1 − δ)k + i. Intertemporal debt b′ is chosen at the
end of the period, and ` is the amount of working capital loans taken out of the
producer. The amount of wages paid to workers and investment for future periods
must be financed by working capital (i.e., ` = wh, where w is the wage rate and
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h is hours). Both intertemporal debt and intratemporal working capital loans are
governed by a collateral constraint (note that intertemporal debt chosen in this
period is constrained by next period’s collateral constraint).
(1 + rn)` ≤

ξn(a)(1− δ)k + b, b ≤ 0
ξn(a)(1− δ)k, b > 0
(3.45)
Here intratemporal debt, which is strictly positive, always counts against this con-
straint. However, intertemporal debt can be negative (in which case it is savings),
which can also be used as collateral, but only to a limited extent. When intertem-
poral debt is negative, it counts fully against the constraint. A key point here is
that the savings rate r differs from the lending rate rn, so the return to b varies





, b ≥ 0
1
1+r
, b < 0
This is also reflected in the collateral constraint: firm liabilities include interest due
at the lending rate rn, while interest at rate r are pledgable along with the principle
if b is positive.
Also, incorporated in this setup is a relationship age a. As this age evolves,
collateral constraints loosen, due to an unmodeled contract under which interest
rates remain constant but collateral requirements slacken. In other words, banks
offer contracts in a competitive environment that allow for increased access to credit
over time. This age of relationship evolves naturally:
a′ =

a+ 1, w/ prob χ
0, w/ prob (1− χ)
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In the calibration that follows, the function that governs the change in ξ(.) with a








ξmax, a < 3
ξmax, a ≥ 3
(3.46)
This setup incorporates a second type of segmentation: one that is dependent on
the length of the relationship. Essentially, the evolving collateral constraint in the
contract embodies “soft” information gathered by the bank over the term of the
contract with the firm. As the bank learns more about the firm, the bank is able to
extend more credit to the firm. However, with probability 1− χ, the relationship is
exogenously dissolved.
Furthermore, I need to specify an AR(1) process for the firm TFP process:
log(z′i) = ν + ϕlog(zi) + ε ε ∼ N(0, σ) (3.47)
Channels for interest rate shocks to affect both demand and supply for credit
now in place. The interest rate directly impacts the incentive to accumulate capital
via the budget constraint in (3.44), which in turn should lead to lower capital, which
can potentially tighten (3.45) in future periods, thereby reducing credit demand. It
remains a quantitative question, now, as to which effect will dominate.
3.5.3 Final Goods Producer and Pricing
Additionally, revenue is not solely determined by production, but also prices.
Prices differ since goods are differentiated. I use a monopolistic competition frame-
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Where yi is the individual i’s physical output. A final goods producer operates
this aggregator technology and sells the final output Y, which is the numeraire.
Payments to producers are made in the numeraire good as well. Thus, I have the













3.5.4 Entrepreneur Life Cycle Dynamics
To characterize an equilibrium, I will need to specify a process for firm dy-
namics. I use the approach of recycling capital from dying firms for new firms. Each
period, a measure 1− ζ firms die exogenously. I assume a fixed amount is given to
new firms to start. Thus, each entrant begins their life with capital:
kent = k̄ (3.51)
Where k̄ is a fixed parameter that I calibrate.
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3.5.5 Banks
There is a continuum of unit mass of banks on each island that compete over
lending opportunities to firms. Since each bank has zero mass, they take prices as
given. Additionally, since there is no entry or exit of banks on the island, I can
characterize the financial sector with a representative bank. This representative
bank’s problem is given by:
πn(Ln; rd, rn) = max
Ln




where Ln is the total amount of lending on island n. Here, the parameters Γn and γ
govern the cost of lending on island n (note that Γn potentially varies across islands).
First order conditions imply:
rn = rd + ΓnL
γ
n (3.53)
Thus, Γn creates a spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate on island
n that is potentially also dependent on loan volume. For simplicity, consider the
case where γ = 0. Then rn = rd + Γn, and Γn is the constant spread of the lending
rate over the interest rate. While the deposit rate and lending rate will ultimately
be determined in equilibrium (using both the household and producer problems),
the spread will be determined in part by the finance sector, and in the special case,
it is entirely determined by the finance sector. In this case, if I hold deposit rates
constant (as in steady state) Γn will directly translate into differences in interest
rates.
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3.5.6 Financial Market Equilibrium
Implicit in the problem above is that total lending is equal to deposits, or∑
n Ln = D. It should be noted that bank lending Ln is equal to both intertemporal
debt and intratemporal debt. Likewise, deposits are the sum of all household savings






[biΥ(bi) + `i] di = s−
∫
i
bi(1−Υ(bi))di = D (3.54)
where i is the index for producers, s is household savings, and bi is debt outstanding.
Υ(.) is an indicator function, which is 1 when bi is positive (borrower) and 0 when




[bi + li] di (3.55)
Thus, savings by households accounts for the disparity between corporate savings
and corporate borrowing. Without idiosyncratic risk, both bi and `i would be weakly
positive, and all savings would be from the household sector. However, the potential
for negative shocks allows for cases where producers want to save, which leads to
negative values of bi. Together with the profit maximization problem of banks from
the previous section and borrowing/lending decisions by households and firms, these
equations characterize an equilibrium in financial markets.
In summary, banks simply act as conduits for savings to find borrowers. How-
ever, this incurs a cost, parameterized by Γn and γ, which creates a spread between
lending and borrowing rates. Furthermore, banks allocate savings by households
and some producers between intertemporal loans to other producers and intratem-
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poral loans by producers. Thus, all three sets of agents potentially have a hand in
determining lending supply.
3.6 Calibration Strategy
In this calibration, I consider a case with two islands. In the baseline, they
are identical with the exception that there is a 50 basis point higher interest rate on
one island. In my calibration, I benchmark parameters to either 2005 data from the
US, or to long-run pre-crisis averages from the US. Model parameters, along with
targets and the results of the calibration, are listed in Table 3.1.
The first two are relatively straightforward parameters, with targets taken from
standard references in the literature or readily available data, (note that the choice
of ρ and α should be chosen jointly). I pick a death rate of 10% as a relatively stan-
dard value, although a more careful calibration taking into account age-dependency
using the Business Dynamics Statistics from the Census Bureau could be used. I
calibrate the bank separation rate to data from my own calculations of the SSBF
(note that this parameter should be chosen jointly with the death rate). I specify
a CRS banking sector in the model. Depreciation is chosen based on Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006).
The persistence of firm productivity is chosen from a range of estimates in
the literature. There is substantial debate as to the best choice. I pick a relatively
down-the-middle value.
Finally, each of the last five parameters are chosen jointly to match the relative
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Table 3.1: Targets for Calibration
Parameter Value Target Criteria/Source Model
ρ 0.9091 10 % Markups: Basu and Fernald (1997)
α 0.3243 60% labor income share:
Cooley and Prescott (1995)
β 0.9615 Annual savings rate of 4%
ζ 0.9 10% death rate
χ 0.95 7.8 year avg. relationship: SSBF
γ 0 CRS banking markets
ϕ 0.8
δ 0.069 Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
k̄ 0.197 0.3 Relative Entrant Size (BDS) 0.22
φ 2.05 Hours = 0.64 0.64
σ 0.1 0.337 S.D. of (i/k): 0.40
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
ξmin 0.5 0.4: Med. Leverage for 0.45
new bank relationships (SSBF)
ξmax 0.9 0.8: Med. Leverage for 0.79
old bank relationships (SSBF)
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size of entrants to the average firm size, number of hours, standard deviation of
investment rates, and leverage over relationship length (which I calculated using the
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF)).
3.7 Quantitative Results
In this section I conduct two sets of exercises, one under partial equilibrium
and one under general equilibrium, and explore the results of three experiments in
each. In each set of exercises, I first increase the interest rate on both islands, but
one island will be hit by a larger shock (1% vs. 2 %). Next, I consider a collateral
constraint shock where each value of the function ξ(a) is tightened. Again, on one
island, there is a tighter constraint. On the island with initially lower interest rates,
the constraint tightens proportionally (for each a) by 2 % (κn = 0.98). On the
island with higher interest rates, the constraint tightens by 4% (κn = 0.96).Finally,
I consider a separation rate shock, where financial separations begin to take place
more frequently on both of the islands. Again, in this case the island with lower
interest rates experiences a small increase in the separation rate to 7%, while the
island with tighter constraints experiences a larger increase to 13%.
In what follows, I first conduct a partial equilibrium exercise where I hold the
distribution over capital and productivity constant (as well as wages and deposit
rates) to investigate several financial shocks in the initial period of the shock. This
exercise is valid for thinking about the initial impact on labor and capital produc-
tivity before firms have had time to adjust their capital stocks. Then I will explore
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long-run steady state effects relative to the baseline given the changes in financial
parameters. With respect to the timing of firm responses, the two sets of exercises
focus on the extreme short run and the extreme long run. There may be additional
implications in the medium-run as the economy adjusts to the shock which will not
be captured in either experiment. While the short and long-run are instructive for
what to expect over the horizon of a recession, it is likely important to take into
account transition dynamics. I leave the exploration of these issues to future work.
3.7.1 Partial Equilibrium: Initial Impact
In this section, I provide results on the initial steady state regime, then three
partial equilibrium exercises where the shifts in parameters described above tran-
spire, but capital stocks have not had time to adjust. Additionally, deposit rates
and wages are set, so no adjustment in prices can mitigate the effect on quanti-
ties. Conceptually, this is similar to the analytical section in that most arguments
are made holding the distribution constant, and abstracting from aggregate price
changes. It can be thought of the initial impact of the financial shock.
Table 3.2 displays results for the baseline and the partial equilibrium outcomes.
I display results for output, hours, capital, the aggregate debt/asset ratio, and TFP.
TFP is defined as Z = Y/(KαH1−α), where Y is aggregate output, H is aggregate
labor, and K is the aggregate capital stock. Each shock induces a decline in output
and hours. The interest rate shock generates a mild decline of output by 1.3% and
a decline of employment by 2.2%. By construction capital remains constant, while
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TFP rises slightly.
A tighter collateral constraint schedule induces a massive decline in output and
hours. In part, this is due to the sticky price, but it is illustrative of the potency of
tightening in the extensive margin of credit. It does generate a sizable increase in
TFP, which is likely due to the decline in capital productivity dispersion (see the
next section).
Table 3.2: Partial Equilibrium Results: Initial Impact
Shock Output Debt/Asset Labor Capital TFP
Baseline 0.844 0.756 0.641 1.288 1.051
High Interest Rate 0.833 0.753 0.626 1.288 1.053
Tight Collateral 0.598 0.577 0.371 1.288 1.075
Constraint
High Bank Separation 0.815 0.740 0.614 1.288 1.045
Likewise, a higher bank separation rate generates a sizable decline in out-
put (3.5%) and employment (4.2%). Leverage declines mildly, and there is modest
impact on TFP, which declines by 0.6%. Again, this decline is likely due to the
correlation between the decline in the collateral constraint among long-lived rela-
tionships and productivity. That is, more productive firms are impacted by the
higher rate of separation.
I now turn to dispersion in labor productivity in each of these experiments.
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Table 3.3 displays the variance decomposition discussed in the analytical section for
the baseline economy and the partial equilibrium analysis. These values are inclusive
of the measure of firms µn that are constrained. For example, the contribution
of the constrained distribution is the average contribution of µnσ
2
n,con Under the
baseline, there is a fair amount of dispersion in labor productivity, which is entirely
due to financial frictions in this economy. Overall, the standard deviation of labor
productivity is about 20 log points. Additional frictions could be added to induce
higher dispersion.
In general, I find very little cross-island dispersion. At most, the standard
variance in the high bank separation rate case generates a standard deviation of
about 2 log points, and still contributes less than 1% of the variance. Much of
within island dispersion is concentrated amongst constrained firms, contributing at
least 3/4 of the variance in each case.
Consistent with the partial equilibrium analysis conducted previously, overall
dispersion falls in response to an interest rate shock, despite the fact that the cross-
island dispersion rises due to heterogeneity of the shock. Furthermore, dispersion
rises for both the uniform decline in collateral constraints and the shock to bank
separations, which is consistent with rising within-island dispersion seen in the de-
composition. Although the contribution of constrained dispersion rises by more in
response to the tighter collateral constraint schedule, the separation shock gener-
ates significant increases in relative means and a slight rise in cross-island dispersion,
generating higher overall dispersion in response to the high separation rate. Also
consistent with the analytical section is the change in the share of constrained firms,
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Table 3.3: Initial Impact on Variance Decomposition of Log Labor Pro-
ductivity
Variance Shock
Contribution Baseline High Tight High Bank
IR CC Separation
Total Dispersion 0.0396 0.0387 0.0582 0.0645
Between-Island 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
(0.00%) (0.04%) (0.00%) (0.65%)
Within-Island 0.0396 0.0387 0.0582 0.0640
(100.00%) (99.96%) (100.00%) (99.35%)
Constrained 0.0299 0.0293 0.0477 0.0492
Dispersion (75.51%) (75.51%) (82.04%) (76.34%)
Constrained 0.0039 0.0040 0.0010 0.0057
Relative Mean (9.88%) (10.24%) (1.71%) (8.84%)
Unconstrained 0.0058 0.0055 0.0095 0.0091
Relative Mean (14.61%) (14.21%) (16.25%) (14.18%)
µn (constrained share) 59.66% 58.12% 90.50% 61.56%
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which falls in response to the interest rate shock, but rises in response to tighter
collateral constraints and higher bank separation.
3.7.1.1 Capital Productivity
Although I have mostly focused on labor productivity in my analytical work,
there are also implications for other marginal revenue products. I now shift focus to
capital productivity, the focus of Gopinath et al. (2017), and Table 3.4 displays the






productivity exhibits about twice as much dispersion as labor, which is primarily
due to the time-to-build assumption, where capital is chosen before productivity
shocks are realized. This not only creates dispersion among constrained firms, but
also unconstrained firms. Additionally, because capital is owned and not rented, it
takes time to accumulate the desired or optimal stock.
Again, little of the dispersion in capital productivity is due to cross-island
dispersion. Oddly, dispersion in capital productivity rises in response to an interest
rate shock but falls in response to tighter collateral constraints, which is consistent
with changes in TFP. Dispersion of capital productivity rises significantly in response
to a separation shock, which is consistent with the decline in aggregate TFP.
3.7.2 Long-run Regime
In the long run, firms adjust to shifts in financial conditions. These responses
generate changes in the distribution of firms, and so it is inappropriate to utilize
107
Table 3.4: Initial Impact on Variance Decomposition of Log Capital Pro-
ductivity
Variance Shock
Contribution Baseline High Tight High Bank
IR CC Separation
Total Dispersion 0.1548 0.1569 0.1392 0.2148
Between-Island 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.02%) (0.39%)
Within-Island 0.1548 0.1569 0.1391 0.2140
(100.00%) (99.17%) (99.99%) (99.61%)
Constrained 0.1076 0.1071 0.1321 0.1792
Dispersion (69.51%) (68.24%) (97.21%) (83.43%)
Unconstrained 0.0239 0.0140 0.0005 0.0073
Dispersion (15.44%) (8.90%) (0.39%) (3.39%)
Constrained 0.0094 0.0101 0.0001 0.0046
Relative Mean (6.07%) (6.41%) (0.04%) (2.13%)
Unconstrained 0.0139 0.0140 0.0005 0.0073
Relative Mean (8.98%) (8.90%) (0.39%) (3.39%)
µn (constrained share) 59.66% 58.12% 90.50% 61.56%
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my analytical predictions and partial equilibrium results for persistent shocks. In
these sets of experiments, I consider steady state equilibria given the same shocks
described above, which are assumed to persist indefinitely. Table 3.5 presents ag-
gregate values from the baseline and three alternative regimes, again highlighting
output, leverage, and productivity. In this case, the economy has responded to the
shock and arrived at the new steady state.
Table 3.5: Long-run Regime Comparisons
Regime Output Debt/Asset Labor Capital TFP
Baseline 0.844 0.756 0.641 1.288 1.051
Interest Rate Shock 0.832 0.750 0.638 1.224 1.055
Tight Collateral 0.838 0.738 0.639 1.272 1.050
Constraint
High Bank Separation 0.827 0.726 0.637 1.229 1.049
Across the new regimes there are substantial declines in output, labor and
capital. The regime with a high interest rate generates an output decline of 1.5%,
an employment decline of 0.4%, and a decline in the capital stock of about 5%.
Additionally, TFP rises by a modest 0.4%, which as can be seen in Table 3.6 as
dispersion falls substantially.
In the tight collateral constraint regime, output falls by 0.8%, employment
falls by about 0.3%, and capital declines by 1.2 %. The incentive to accumulate
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capital in order to loosen the constraint keeps capital from falling as much in this
regime, and so labor does not fall by much more than in the interest rate regime.
TFP declines slightly, reflecting rising labor but falling capital dispersion.
In the high separation rate regime, output falls by a little over 3%, with labor
falling by 0.6%, and capital dropping by 4.6%. This translates into a small decline
in TFP of 0.2%.
These results reflect changes in the distribution of firms which can be seen
in Table 3.6. Again, below is the decomposition proposed in the analytical section.
Here, the distributional changes are similar to that of the partial equilibrium section.
Relative to Gopinath et al. (2017), these results are consistent with the effect of an
interest rate shock: higher interest rates lead to long-run declines in productivity
dispersion. Additionally, I also find there is an increase in dispersion in response to
a uniform collateral constraint shock, as well as to a bank separation shock.
3.7.2.1 Capital Productivity
in Table 3.7, I explore the implications of each regime for capital productivity
(this is the most closely related exercise to Gopinath et al. (2017)). As before, there
is substantially more dispersion in capital productivity. Again, dispersion either
falls modestly, as in the high interest rate regime and tight collateral constraint
regime, or rises slightly, as in the high separation regime. The decline in dispersion
in the collateral constraint regime is likely indicative of substantial changes in the
composition of the firm distribution in response to the parameter shifts. Since most
110
Table 3.6: Long-Run Variance Decomposition of Log Labor Productivity
Variance Regime
Contribution Baseline High Tight High Bank
IR CC Separation
Total Dispersion 0.0396 0.0351 0.0398 0.0397
Between-Island 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.01%)
Within-Island 0.0396 0.0351 0.0398 0.0397
(100.00%) (99.99%) (99.98%) (100.00%)
Constrained 0.0299 0.0261 0.0381 0.0284
Dispersion (75.51%) (74.51%) (95.60%) (71.71%)
Constrained 0.0039 0.0035 0.0002 0.0045
Relative Mean (9.88%) (10.10%) (0.43%) (11.43%)
Unconstrained 0.0058 0.0054 0.0016 0.0067
Relative Mean (14.61%) (15.39%) (3.97%) (16.86%)
µn (constrained share) 59.66% 60.35% 90.33% 59.72%
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firms are constrained, the impact on dispersion is solely through the dispersion
among constrained firms. Unlike in Gopinath et al. (2017), the majority of my
firms are constrained to begin with, and more become constrained with collateral
constraint shocks. Together with results from previous research, this potentially
suggests dispersion is non-monotonic in the share of constrained firms.
3.7.2.2 The Cross-Island Channel
In both the partial equilibrium and long-run steady state results, it is still the
case that within-island dispersion drives overall dispersion. Cross-island dispersion
continues to be muted. In order to better understand the conditions under which
cross-island dispersion matters, I consider a couple of partial equilibrium cases.
Exercise 1
First, I ask the question under what circumstances will the cross-island disper-
sion generated by a heterogeneous interest rate shock swamp the decline in within-
island dispersion. In other words, how big does the gap between island borrowing
rates need to be to generate enough cross-island dispersion to overcome the decline
in within-island dispersion associated with the shock. Specifically, I hold the interest
rate on island 1 constant at 4.5%, and increase the interest rate on island 2 until
dispersion is the same as in the baseline (again holding the distribution and wages
constant). I find that an increase of 25 percent is necessary to generate enough
cross-island dispersion to reach this level. At this point, the normalized cross-island
means term is equivalent to about 7 log points, and contributes about 15% of the
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Table 3.7: Long-run Variance Decomposition of Log Capital Productivity
Variance Regime
Contribution Baseline High Tight High Bank
IR CC Separation
Total Dispersion 0.1548 0.1402 0.1512 0.1561
Between-Island 0.0000 0.0012 0.0003 0.0004
(0.00%) (0.83%) (0.32%) (0.28%)
Within-Island 0.1548 0.1390 0.1511 0.1557
(100.00%) (99.17%) (99.97%) (99.72%)
Constrained 0.1076 0.0931 0.1286 0.1143
Dispersion (69.51%) (66.44%) (85.05%) (73.22%)
Unconstrained 0.0239 0.0149 0.0151 0.0105
Dispersion (15.44%) (10.64%) (9.96%) (6.71%)
Constrained 0.0094 0.0098 0.0016 0.0070
Relative Mean (6.07%) (6.99%) (1.07%) (4.46%)
Unconstrained 0.0139 0.0149 0.0151 0.0242
Relative Mean (8.98%) (10.64%) (9.96%) (15.48%)




Another experiment is to ask under what combination of shocks would cross-
island dispersion begin to matter. In particular, since the separation rate seems
to generate higher contributions of between dispersion, and higher interest rate
dispersion necessarily translates into higher cross-island dispersion, a combination
of an heterogeneous interest rate shock and a separation shock could induce higher
between dispersion. Specifically, the exercise consists of finding the shift in interest
rate on island 2 under the heightened bank separation rates considered earlier (7%
on island 1 and 13 % on island 2) would the resulting between-island dispersion in
exercise 1. I find that an increase of 19%, as opposed to 25%, is required in this
case. While this is still a substantial increase in borrowing costs, it suggests that
these frictions can interact to increase the relative contribution of between-island
dispersion to overall variance.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework for evaluating the impact of financial market
segmentation and financial shocks on aggregate and micro-level outcomes. I show
that labor productivity dispersion can be decomposed into within-geography and
between-geography components, and that the within component is generally dom-
inant. Furthermore, I show that different types of financial shocks have different
implications for the initial impact on labor productivity dispersion. However, there
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is potential in the long run for many of these effects to be mitigated by the changing
distribution of firms.
These results provide simple predictions for the impact of financial shocks on
within-location productivity patterns. Given the evidence on initial impact of fi-
nancial shocks, one would expect geographies hit by interest rate shocks to behave
differently (exhibiting a decline in dispersion) relative to geographies hit by bank
separation or collateral constraint shocks (which would exhibit an increase in disper-
sion). Researchers should consider using microdata on firm labor productivity could
be used to implement a strategy that examines the patterns of labor productivity
dispersion in response to proxies for financial shocks.
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Appendix A: Bank balance sheet variables based on Cole and White
(2012)
Variables expressed as a percentage of assets unless otherwise noted
• Return on Average Assets: Interest and Noninterest income
• Efficiency Ratio: (noninterest income + net interest margin)/noninterest ex-
pense
• Equity Ratio
• Core Deposit Ratio: Non-brokered deposits
• Money Market Ratio
• Security Ratio
• Mortgage Backed Security Ratio: Agency and non-Agency
• Mortgage Ratio: 1-4 family homes
• Home Equity Lines of Credit
• Non-mortgage RE Ratio
• Commercial Loan Ratio
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• Consumer Loan Ratio
• Non-Performing Loan Ratio
• Loan Loss Allowance Ratio
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Appendix B: Alternative Explanations for Relationship between House
Prices and Young Firm Employment
Does this strategy isolate a lending channel from other potential explanations?
Let us take each of the potential rival explanations discussed in Davis and Halti-
wanger (2017) and examine whether the interaction considered above is influenced.
B.1 Wealth Effects
An increase (or decrease) in house prices creates wealth effects through two
channels. First, higher wealth among potential entrepreneurs creates an appetite for
further risk, and may increase the entrepreneur’s desire to take on a risky project
which may prove to be successful.1 Secondly, to the extent that individuals enjoy
“being their own boss”, a la Hurst and Pugsley (2015), they may be more likely to
strike out on their own when they have more wealth associated with higher house
prices. While these explanations differ in terms of what “types” of entrepreneurs en-
ter, they both imply an increase in entry and employment in the short run. However,
1Davis and Haltiwanger (2017) draw out this point citing theoretical work by Khilstrom and
Laffont (1979) and more recent empirical work documenting the relationship between wealth and
risk aversion in Guiso and Paiella (2008).
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the effect on productivity should differ.
Does variation in bank balance sheets prior to the turn in house prices change
the sensitivity of these entrepreneurs to house prices outside of a change in lending
practices? It is hard to see how. If the mortgage portfolio of bank balance sheets
prior to the peak is somehow correlated with risk taking and self-employment af-
ter the peak, it would almost certainly have to come either from general business
conditions or lending terms.
B.2 Collateral Effects
However, lending terms themselves can be linked to the value of houses. In par-
ticular, homes can be used as collateral by which entrepreneurs and small businesses
can gain access to finance. As house prices fall, constraints tighten mechanically. In
general, loans provided to small businesses on the basis of housing collateral should
be classified as a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC). In fact, in the data, I can
observe the bank’s exposure to such loans, and I create ratios that are then included
in the regressions run in the previous section.
Could it be that lending declines simply because housing collateral values de-
cline, and somehow this is correlated with other bank balance sheet variables? It
is possible that willingness to grant HELOCs to entrepreneurs is correlated with
mortgage exposure, for example. In this case, states with higher mortgage concen-
trations could have granted more HELOCs pre-crisis and the sensitivity to house
prices is due to declining collateral values. However, including a measure of HELOC
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lending in the regression itself should control for this. Furthermore, this could be
an additional effect that might be separable from the credit lending channel in the
regression presented above.
B.3 Other Credit Supply Shifts
Other potential channels of house prices through credit supply could be in-
volved. For instance, declines in house prices could indicate declines in future busi-
ness prospects, and so credit lending is responding endogenously to future business
outcomes (left hand side is impacting the right hand side). However, the design of
the regression, which uses pre-crisis residential bank balance sheet variables should
be orthogonal both due to sectoral differences and the timing assumption, since it
is plausible that the events post-2007 were surprising to most banks from a 2005
perspective.
Secondly, credit supply shifts could occur that are orthogonal to local business
conditions and housing market conditions. Using a method as in Greenstone et al.
(2014), which instruments for large bank lending, I can control for such effects in a
sample of banks that is largely orthogonal to the one I consider above.
B.4 Non-uniform Consumption Expenditure Response
I control for general business conditions and demand using the change in the
unemployment rate, as well as the unemployment rate interacted with house price
changes. However this may obscure a differential response of young vs. old due to
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differential demand responses. In short, consumers may cut demand more for young
business goods during a recession than for older businesses. I could account for this
by performing similar regressions using tradable sectors, rather than the broad set
of industries used above.
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Appendix C: Model Fit and Relevance Statistics
In this section, I present the R2 measures for the regressions run in the main
body of the text, using adjusted and centered measures where appropriate. Further-
more, I report first-stage Kleiberggen-Paap (K-P) cluster-robust first-stage statistics
for all instruments, as well as the Angrist-Pischke (A-P) statistics for relevance of
each instrumented variable when instrumenting for more than one variable.
Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.013 0.031 0.021
N 26,440,000 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
IV
Centered R2 0.040 0.013 0.032 0.021
N 18,520,000 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000




Adjusted R2 0.013 0.031 0.021
N 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
Total IV
Centered R2 0.013 0.032 0.021
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table C.2: R2 of Main House Price/Mortgage Share Regressions
Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.031 0.021
N 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
Instrumented HPI
Centered R2 0.013 0.032 0.021
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Instrumented Bank Exit
Centered R2 0.013 0.031 0.023
N 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
Instrumented HPI and Bank Exit
Centered R2 0.013 0.032 0.021
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table C.3: R2 of Main House Price/Bank Exit Regressions
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Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
IV
F-Stat 103.6 99.9 100.8 121.7
N 18,520,000 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table C.4: First Stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald and Angrist-Pischke F-stats of
Main House Price Regressions
Young Old/Small Old/Large
Total IV
K-P F-stat 12.0 14.8 16.3
HPI A-P F-stat 67.3 69.2 36.0
HPI*MTG RATIO A-P F-stat 21.4 25.6 15.1
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table C.5: First Stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald and Angrist-Pischke F-stats of




F-stat 99.9 99.9 121.0
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Instrumented Bank Exit
K-P F-stat 17.3 13.7 11.2
N 7,860,000 16,310,000 2,270,000
K-P F-stat 13.8 11.0 17.5
ˆHPI A-P F-stat 16.0 12.6 11.3
B̂E A-P F-stat 15.3 11.9 19.8
N 5,700,000 11,290,000 1,530,000
Table C.6: First Stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald and Angrist-Pischke F-stats of
Main House Price/Bank Exit Regressions
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Appendix D: Tradable Sector Results
Restricting the sample of industries under consideration to those in the trad-
able sector, as defined by Mian and Sufi (2014), I consider the effect of house prices
on employment outcomes, splitting by age and size as in the main text. Furthermore,
I consider the mortgage share and bank exit approaches.
I find that house prices have significant effects on young businesses in par-
ticular, even among “tradable” industries. There is also an impact of house prices
on old/small businesses, but this is not robust to instrumenting for house prices.
The bank exit approach does indicate a significant impact of the bank balance sheet
channel on old/small businesses for the bank balance sheet channel. However, there
does not appear to be a significant impact of the interaction of mortgages with house
prices.
In addition, I provide model fit and first-stage relevance tests in tables below.
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Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
4 HPI 0.1041*** 0.2956*** 0.0562** -0.0046
(0.0243) (0.0614) (0.0241) (0.0424)
N 1,250,000 240,000 880,000 130,000
IV
4 HPI 0.1733*** 0.4900*** 0.0440 -0.0755
(0.0590) (0.1618) (0.0640) (0.1273)
N 870,000 170,000 620,000 80,000





4 HPI 0.3021*** 0.0552** -0.0054
(0.0626) (0.0241) (0.0418)
Bank Exit 0.1606** -0.0367* -0.0324
(0.0726) (0.0222) (0.0512)
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Instrumented HPI
4 ˆHPI 0.4917*** 0.0435 -0.0765
(0.1606) (0.0647) (0.1270)
Bank Exit 0.1821** -0.0464* -0.0229
(0.0843) (0.0250) (0.0644)
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Instrumented Bank Exit
4 HPI 0.2726*** 0.0519** -0.0067
(0.0612) (0.0233) (0.0411)
B̂E -0.5711** -0.1529 -0.0868
(0.2524) (0.1107) (0.2147)
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Instrumented HPI and Bank Exit
4 ˆHPI 0.5314*** 0.0620 0.0128
(0.1395) (0.0567) (0.1190)
B̂E 0.0104 -0.3260** 0.2343
(0.5114) (0.1617) (0.3150)
N 170,000 620,000 80,000




4 HPI 0.4198*** 0.1533*** 0.0485
(0.0977) (0.0452) (0.0640)
4 HPI* 0.1340 0.1120*** 0.0639
MTG RATIO (0.0875) (0.0373) (0.0629)
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Total IV
4 HPI -0.1240 0.1913 0.3538
(0.4795) (0.1631) (0.3158)
4 HPI* -0.5815 0.1385 0.4105
MTG RATIO (0.3865) (0.1193) (0.2685)
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Table D.3: Employment Growth Regressions on House Price/Mortgage Share Inter-
actions by Firm Age/Size
Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.015 0.039 0.013
N 1,250,000 240,000 880,000 130,000
IV
Centered R2 0.052 0.026 0.042 0.026
N 870,000 170,000 620,000 80,000




Adjusted R2 0.015 0.039 0.013
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Instrumented HPI
Centered R2 0.026 0.042 0.026
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Instrumented Bank Exit
Centered R2 0.028 0.042 0.034
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Instrumented HPI and Bank Exit
Centered R2 0.026 0.042 0.026
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Table D.5: R2 of Tradable House Price/Bank Exit Regressions
Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.039 0.013
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Total IV
Centered R2 0.026 0.042 0.026
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Table D.6: R2 of Tradable House Price/Mortgage Share Regressions
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Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
IV
F-Stat 96.9 130.6 88.3 91.7
N 870,000 170,000 620,000 80,000




F-stat 131.9 86.1 89.8
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Instrumented Bank Exit
K-P F-stat 18.5 15.0 25.9
N 240,000 880,000 130,000
Total IV
K-P F-stat 9.8 9.6 18.8
ˆHPI A-P F-stat 16.7 10.7 8.4
B̂E A-P F-stat 11.9 10.1 20.5
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Table D.8: First Stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald and Angrist-Pischke F-stats of




K-P F-stat 11.8 12.9 17.4
HPI A-P F-stat 105.6 108.6 39.8
HPI*MTG RATIO A-P F-stat 35.4 41.4 23.1
N 170,000 620,000 80,000
Table D.9: First Stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald and Angrist Pischke F-stats of
Tradable House Price/Mortgage Share Regressions
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Appendix E: Firm Results
These results reflect regressions similar to those run in the main text, but
where the unit of observation is now the firm. In these regressions, assumptions are
made for firm location and industry based on modal employment. The county with
the largest share of employment is assumed to be the firm’s location, and likewise the
firm’s industry is assumed to be the industry with the largest share of employment
in the firm. These results are broadly consistent with the results in the main text,
although the results for old/large businesses are even weaker.
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Total Young Old/Small Old/Large
OLS
4 HPI 0.1235*** 0.1694*** 0.1114*** -0.0080
(0.0305) (0.0346) (0.0288) (0.0464)
Firm-Year Obs. 16,530,000 4,750,000 11,740,000 50,000
IV
4ĤPI 0.1446*** 0.1976*** 0.1347** -0.1136
(0.0504) (0.0597) (0.0519) (0.1014)
Firm-Year Obs. 11,730,000 3,480,000 8,220,000 30,000
Table E.1: Firm-Level Employment Growth Regressions on House Prices. Note: Young
< 5yo, Old>=5 yo, Small <500 employees, Large >=500 employees; includes log(DHS
denominator), county effects, industry effects, time effects, and changes in county and
state unemployment rates. 4ĤPI indicates house prices instrumented by changes in




4 HPI 0.2604*** 0.1643*** 0.0030
(0.0391) (0.0228) (0.0552)
4 HPI* 0.1109*** 0.0675*** 0.0126
MTG (0.0340) (0.0259) (0.0485)
Firm-Year Obs. 4,750,000 11,740,000 50,000
IV
4HPI 0.3020** 0.3127*** -0.0027
(0.1304) (0.0987) (0.2115)
4 HPI* 0.1311 0.1933** 0.0617
MTG (0.1048) (0.0852) (0.1882)
Firm-Year Obs. 3,480,000 8,220,000 30,000
Table E.2: Firm-Level Employment Growth Regressions on House Prices and Mortgage
Share Interactions. Note: Young < 5yo, Old>=5 yo, Small <500 employees, Large >=500
employees; includes log(DHS denominator), county effects, industry effects, time effects,
and changes in county and state unemployment rates.4ĤPI indicates house prices in-




4 HPI 0.1682*** 0.1097*** -0.0079
(0.0346) (0.0285) (0.0467)
Bank Exit -0.0400 -0.0555*** 0.0048
(0.0245) (0.0129) (0.0373)
Firm-Year Obs. 4,750,000 11,740,000 50,000
Instrumented HPI
4ĤPI 0.1966*** 0.1341*** -0.1140
(0.0598) (0.0515) (0.1017)
Bank Exit -0.0452 -0.0581*** -0.0113
(0.0278) (0.0140) (0.0455)
Firm-Year Obs. 3,480,000 8,220,000 30,000
Instrumented Bank Exit
4 HPI 0.1662*** 0.1060*** -0.0115
(0.0359) (0.0290) (0.0481)
B̂E -0.1075 -0.1834** -0.1223
(0.1346) (0.0868) (0.1807)
Firm-Year Obs. 4,750,000 11,740,000 50,000
Table E.3: Firm-Level Employment Growth Regressions on House Prices and State Bank
Exit Share. Note: Young < 5yo, Old>=5 yo, Small <500 employees, Large >=500 em-
ployees; includes log(DHS denominator), county effects, industry effects, time effects, and
changes in county and state unemployment rates.4ĤPI indicates house prices instru-
mented by changes in state unemployment interacted with Saiz elasticities.
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Figure E.1: Effect of 5% HPI Change on Firm-level DHS Employment Growth,
Old/Small Firms
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Figure E.2: Effect of 5% HPI Change on Firm-level DHS Employment Growth,
Young Firms
138
Figure E.3: Effect of Average State-Level HPI Change on Firm-level DHS Employ-
ment Growth, Old/Small Firms
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Figure E.4: Effect of Average State-Level HPI Change on Firm-level DHS Employ-
ment Growth, Young Firms
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